



Effects of US Cold War Policy on the Modern State of Yemen: 1978 Through Unification and Civil War

Citation

Rego, Charles. 2018. Effects of US Cold War Policy on the Modern State of Yemen: 1978 Through Unification and Civil War. Master's thesis, Harvard Extension School.

Link

<http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42004014>

Terms of use

This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material (LAA), as set forth at

<https://harvardwiki.atlassian.net/wiki/external/NGY5NDE4ZjgzNTc5NDQzMGIzZWZhMGFIOWI2M2EwYTg>

Accessibility

<https://accessibility.huit.harvard.edu/digital-accessibility-policy>

Share Your Story

The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. [Submit a story](#)

Effects of US Cold War Policy on the Modern State of Yemen:
1978 Through Unification and Civil War

Charles P. Rego

A Thesis in the Field of International Relations
for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

Harvard University

May 2018

Abstract

The foes of the Cold War extended the boundaries of their respective conflict throughout the emerging developing world in a race for strategic placement and domination. Through vast and lucrative aid programs, young and poor nations alike traded access to infrastructure, energy stores and security for weapons and funding. Yemen, the impoverished state beholden to the policies and insecurities of its more powerful neighboring states, would also become a battleground for influence between the US and Soviet Union. But unlike other conflict points, the Cold War and the hegemons at the helm of the ideological struggle had little effect on Yemeni domestic policies and future unification.

Throughout this Thesis, I examined the amounts of aid provided to North Yemen by the US from the mid-1970s through the end of the Cold War. This specific period accounts for the majority of US involvement with Yemen during the Cold War. I analyzed the approaches taken by the US to ensure that Yemen, which has significant control to a critically strategic maritime thoroughfare remains outside of the Soviet sphere of influence. Furthermore, the research highlights what effects the aid, both material and monetary have on the emerging nation state and its stability after the Cold War ended and funding dramatically decreased. Through research of diplomatic communications, government publications and interviews of former US diplomats assigned to Yemen, I will identify the precursors that led to increases in US aid to Yemen and how US policy towards Yemen would form and evolve up through unification.

Dedication

To my loving wife Jeanette who has sacrificed and inspired me throughout my academic pursuits. For my children, Abigail and Ethan, who filled me with hope, love and strength through this long and arduous journey. My family has served as my emotional support providing me the fortitude to complete my academic ambitions.

To my uncle Jesus, who passed before he could witness my graduation. You always believed in me, and your encouragement was my catalyst to continuously challenge myself.

And to my Mother in Law Ines, who helped raise my young children as I focused on completing my graduate thesis. Your selfless sacrifice enabled me to focus and dedicate countless hours for my research.

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the following whose dedicated support and guidance attributed to my success in completing this research and thesis. Throughout this journey I have had the distinct opportunity to learn from the leading academics and experts in my chosen field of study.

Dr Asher Orkaby, who accepted and committed his expertise and time to my research. I am indebted to his mentorship and his proficiency in the subject matter. Dr Orkaby's guidance and dedication to my work navigated me through a difficult but gratifying nine months of work. Not only did I learn to become a better researcher, his leadership taught me valuable skills that will make me a better military officer.

Dr Doug Bond who assisted me in preparing my proposal and searching for the best suited advisor for my research.

Dr Ariane Liazos who taught me to write, research and effectively use libraries and sources.

Dr Anthony Atwood, Director of the Miami Military Museum, for his guidance and friendship.

And finally to all those who supported me along this journey who I was not able to mention individually.

Table of Contents

Dedication.....	iv
Acknowledgements.....	v
List of Tables.....	viii
List of Figures.....	ix
Acronyms.....	x
Chapter I. Introduction.....	1
Research and Limitations.....	3
Why Yemen?.....	4
Chapter II. Cold War and US Strategy	9
Chapter III. The Role of Saudi Arabia.....	13
Chapter IV. Political Landscape.....	18
The Yemenite Jews.....	20
The USSR and Yemen.....	21
North Yemen Civil War.....	22
South Yemen.....	23
The US and North Yemen.....	30
Chapter V. Crisis in 1979.....	48
Peace Corps and USAID.....	52
Saleh and Soviet Weapons Acquisition-1979.....	55
Chapter VI. Unification.....	65

Chapter VII. The End of the Cold War.....	69
References.....	80

List of Tables

Table 1. Saudi Arabian and Yemeni GDP, 1977-1991.....	16
---	----

List of Figures

Figure 1. Bab el-Mandeb Maritime Chokepoint.....	6
Figure 2. Yemen in Relation to the Indian Ocean.....	6
Figure 3. USAID graph depicting US economic and military aid to Yemen.....	8
Figure 4. Operation on Eagles Wings.....	21
Figure 5. Communist Military Present in Less Developed Countries.....	29
Figure 6. US Petroleum Imports.....	31
Figure 7. Personal remittances, Republic of Yemen, 1990-1993.....	75
Figure 8. Yemen Crude Production, Exports, Consumption.....	78

List of Acronyms

ACC	Arab Cooperation Council
AIYS	American Institute for Yemeni Studies
DOD	Department of Defense
FSA	Federation of South Arabia
FLOSY	Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NDF	National Democratic Front
NEA	Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
NLF	National Liberation Front
NSA	National Security Advisor
NSC	National Security Council
PDRY	Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen
UN	United Nations
USAF	United States Air Force
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USMTM	US Military Training Mission
YAR	Yemen Arab Republic
YSP	Yemen Socialist Party

Chapter I

Introduction

On November 9, 1989, the world erupted in celebration as the Cold War symbolically came to an end. Western powers reveled in jubilee as the threat of communist aggression and nuclear devastation faded into history. Newly independent countries sprang up from the remnants of the Soviet Union and by 1991, the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist. But for the newly unified Republic of Yemen whose predecessor independent states had received generous aid packages and political support from both Cold War adversaries, an uncertain future lay in a new world free of hegemonic power struggles.¹ Like many developing countries, the governments of both North and South Yemen were influenced by the Cold War powers and allies due to its strategic importance.

The use of aid, either monetary, logistical or through direct military assistance, greatly expanded the reach and influence for the US and Soviet Union. Lucrative programs to develop key infrastructure, modernize militaries and pay for projects which

¹ For the purposes of this paper, the following terms are used to categorize the territories and states that encompass the modern Republic of Yemen. 1. North Yemen: Geographic area encompassing the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) from 1962 through 1990. Sources utilized throughout this research may identify the YAR as North Yemen, Yemen or the YAR in direct quotations, but throughout this paper, all references other than quotes to the geographic area will be identified as North Yemen. 2. Republic of Yemen: Geographic area encompassing the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and YAR which were unified to create one single state in 1990. South Yemen: Geographic area encompassing the PDRY from 1967 through 1990. Sources utilized throughout this research may identify the region as the PDRY, the Federation of South Arabia, Protectorate of South Arabia, the People's Republic of Southern Yemen or Yemen in direct quotations, but throughout this paper, all references other than quotes to the geographic area will be identified as South Yemen.

were otherwise outside of developing nation's budgets enhanced access to strategically necessary objectives. Economic incentives, advanced weapons and military advisement were difficult to ignore as governments in power explored the means necessary to solidify power at home, empower and enrich loyal factions and expand international recognition. Access to ports, airfields, oil, minerals and friendly armies were critical as the Cold War foes raced to expand their respective reach in every region of the world.

Foreign aid was a powerful tool for the most powerful nations and was at times held as a bargaining chip to gain favor with varying strategic interests. In Hans Morgenthau's 1962 paper *A Political Theory of Foreign Aid*, he identified six forms of foreign aid: Humanitarian, subsistence aid, military, bribery, prestige foreign aid and foreign aid for economic development.² With Yemen the US used every form of aid in order to maintain its fragile government and weaken the Soviet push for influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Aid amounts were measured based on strategic significance and within the Middle East, states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran who were critically important due commodity and location access received extensive modern military packages, and the attention of top US policy makers. Small states were flooded with weapons they could otherwise afford. Relations with questionable regimes strengthened in a quest for strategic dominance.

Throughout the Cold War the US limited its diplomatic efforts with Yemen quite often reacting carelessly to problems within the impoverished state they did not essentially understand. The problems faced by Yemen appeared as more of a nuisance to broader US Middle East Policy. Gregory Gause, Professor of International Affairs and

² Hans J Morgenthau "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid" *American Political Science Review* vol. 56, no. 2 (1962): 301-302.

Head of the International Affairs Department at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, argues that the west has done little to understand the politics of Yemen and not until the regional crisis in 1979, discovery of oil in the early 1980s or the onset of the Gulf War did Yemen receive diplomatic consideration.³ The problems Yemen faced were an indirect threat to broader US regional interests. Nevertheless, the US provided Sana'a with weapons and funds to thwart Soviet expansion and to stabilize the fragile central government while relegating it as a peripheral country in its broader regional diplomatic efforts.

Research and Limitations

This research focuses on US policies regarding Yemen through the Cold War and how those policies affected Yemen as a state. The majority of the research focuses on US government policies through analysis of internal government communications and publications as well as US government external relations with parties interested in Yemeni issues. Existing literature was also reviewed to gain a broader understanding of previous analysis. Interviews of US diplomats provided a deeper understanding of the direction the US government took regarding Yemen as well as providing a personal vantage point describing what level of importance the US placed on Yemeni affairs. The most significant limitations faced during this research was the lack of access to available Yemeni government documentation or literature to understand the Yemeni internal views on US policies. The ongoing conflict which began in 2015 made any travel to the

³ Gregory F. Gause, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) 1-15.

Republic of Yemen unfeasible and access to reliable Yemeni government archives outside of Sana'a were not found by the author throughout the period of research.

Why Yemen?

As of 2016, Yemen was a country of 27 million persons, 40 percent which are under the age of 14, 33 percent who are unemployed and had a GDP of \$2,700. The Republic of Yemen is the second most armed nation in the world, following the US, and has seen multiple periods of internal armed conflict since 1962. Many of these weapons, small arms rifles and handguns, are relics of years of war, many provided by the US, Soviet Union and other allied nations locked in the broader Cold War struggle. By comparison, Saudi Arabia who lines the Republic of Yemen's northern border has a GDP of \$53,600 and Oman who borders the Republic of Yemen to the east has a GDP of \$44,600. Since the collapse of President Ali Abdullah Saleh's government in 2012 the country has again returned to war, this time involving Saudi Arabia and other Arab partners, creating a significant humanitarian crisis.

Yemen has a long, complicated and proud history but for the purposes of this research, only the periods after the end of the Second World War and on are covered. In Southern Yemen, a Marxist government gained power after the end of British colonial rule eventually establishing the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) in 1978 as one of the more successful attempts at a socialist government in the Arab world. Unlike the Tudeh in Iran, the YSP brought together different socialist and Marxist factions to form a government which lasted through unification. The YSP and Adens government were not without internal conflict and various wars, assassinations and political conflicts stained the

socialist state. But they remained the Soviet's most trusted satellite within the region and equitable base from where to launch subversive insurgencies, socialist educational programs and military power. Through the development of a small but skilled and well equipped military force, South Yemen was able to win decisive battles and place fear into their regional foes.

Throughout the Cold War, Yemen was treated as a second tier country and only during times of absolute crisis did the US expend diplomatic capital. Because of its strategic position and Adens drift towards Marxism, both North and South Yemen fell victim to the greater ideological conflicts of the Cold War. The Republic of Yemen sits at the mouth of the Bab el-Mandeb, an 18 mile wide strait which leads into the Red Sea and sees over 3.8 million barrels of oil travel through it daily. Figure 1 displays the narrow nature of the Bab el-Mandeb and Figure 2 displays Yemen's geographic position into the Indian Ocean, Eastern Africa and most of Southern Asia. For the west, the Bab al-Mandeb leads into the Red Sea and is critical for freedom of navigation between Europe, the US and Asia. The US Navy relies on the chokepoint as a safe passageway for the 5th Fleet which otherwise extends the time naval vessels can deploy to events throughout the region. For the Soviet Union, the Bab al-Mandeb was the opening into the Indian Ocean for its Black Sea Fleet. The Bab al-Mandeb is the only southern gateway to the Suez Canal and any effective disruption to the passage ways safety would effectively cease traffic through the canal. Any well placed weaponry along Yemen's southwestern coast could inherently wreak chaos on maritime traffic and effectively shut down the passage way.



Figure 1. Bab el-Mandeb Maritime Chokepoint. Map obtained from US Energy Information Administration, accessed on December 21, 2017, <https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=32352>



Figure 2. Yemen in Relation to the Indian Ocean. Map obtained from Council on Foreign Relations, accessed December 21, 2017, http://files.foreignaffairs.com/legacy/images/Kaplan_Map_v2Small.jpg

Although Yemen's role in the greater Cold War conflict may appear insignificant, its position made it a strategic concern for the Soviets, the US and Saudi Arabia. As Mark N. Katz, a Rockefeller Foundation International Relations Fellow, wrote:

North Yemen is important to the East and West; The West fears that if a leftist government should ever come to power in North Yemen, Saudi Arabia would be more vulnerable to a Marxist subversion than it is now from the direction of the less populous South Yemen; Nevertheless North Yemen poses a potential threat to Soviet interests as well; its larger population may one day allow it to defeat South Yemen militarily or to dominate it should peaceful unification ever occur.⁴

North and South Yemen were both poverty stricken states, each plagued with their own respective conflicts and beholden to the interests of their more powerful neighbors. As Figure 3 depicts, US military and economic aid to North Yemen began to increase from the mid 1970s with periods of fluctuation until it reached a significant height in the early 1980s where it began to gradually taper off until it abruptly ending after 1990. This thesis does not include similar data for the Soviet Union's contributions throughout the same period, but several references to the numerous weapon systems provided to both North and South Yemen are cited.

⁴ Mark Katz, "Sanaa and the Soviets." *Problems of Communism* vol. 33, no. 1 (1984): 21-34.




Figure 3. USAID graph depicting US economic and military aid to Yemen. Chart obtained from US Agency for International Development, accessed on April 15, 2017, <https://explorer.usaid.gov/aid-trends.html>

Chapter II.

Cold War and US Strategy

The end of World War II brought about a short lived peace as tensions between US and Soviet political ideologies silently emerged and placed the world at the brink of another global conflict. As German armies collapsed Western and Soviet armies raced towards Berlin to not only claim the Nazi prize and end the war, but to capture influence over future spheres of influence in the ensuing ideological conflict. After the war and throughout the latter half of the 20th century, the competing interests of the dominant superpowers spread to all reaches of the world. A race for influence over the post-colonial world and developing countries ensued as the US and the Soviet Union wrestled for strategic and political influence.

By 1947, tensions between the Soviet Union and the US rose as pro-communist movements began to expand through Turkey, Iran, Greece and the Balkans. In order to cease the perceived communist incursions throughout the world, the US had to develop to complete strategy utilizing all instruments of national power. In 1950, National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68) was approved by President Harry S. Truman laying the framework for the US policy to contain and combat Soviet expansion. NSC 68 identified the Soviet threat as imminent and that “the Kremlin was on a path to world domination.”⁵ NSC 68 served as the strategic roadmap that charted the course of US efforts to counter the Soviet Union through foreign aid, militarization and diplomatic efforts. The strategy

⁵ "A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68," 12 April 1950.

became the basis of Cold War doctrine at stemming Soviet expansion through aggressive efforts to attain alliances throughout strategically critical regions. Within the Middle East efforts at Soviet curtailment became evident prior the publication of NSC 68 and as the decades progressed, the US would focus additional efforts to limit the Soviet expansion.

For American strategists, one significant lesson of World War II was the vital importance of mineral and energy resources necessary to wage war. Control of oil fields was crucial to not only mobilize vast naval and air fleets but also to prevent the enemy the means to carry out the same. Similarly, the rapid growth of industrialized economies demanded increased reliance on energy making. Access to unrestricted energy stores was and continues to be National security concern. During the January 1980 State of the Union Address, President Carter declared “Our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our Nation's security.”⁶ Months earlier, the President’s Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger stated during a policy meeting on the Middle East that “without Middle Eastern oil the Free World as we knew it was through.”⁷ In the decades after the end of WWII, US reliance on Saudi Arabian oil grew and security of the expansive oil fields was paramount. In 1953, the US created The United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia; a unique mission, strengthened through a US- Saudi Arabian Agreement in 1977, that exists to “train, advise and assist” Saudi

⁶ Jimmy Carter, "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress," January 23, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079> (accessed October 10, 2017).

⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 26. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d26>

military forces in defense of the kingdom.⁸ Throughout the latter half of the Cold War and beyond, the US committed itself to defend the kingdom and its vast oil reserves.

For the Soviet Union the need for oil supplies strengthened their resolve for alliances within the Middle East. The vast reserves of oil Russia holds within Siberia were not accessible for extraction in the 1970s. The growing military enterprises, fleets and jet aircraft required vastly greater amounts of oil than the technologies of World War II and access to supply fields was critical for flawless logistical flow in the event of a war. With Iran and Saudi Arabia both allied with the US, the best approach for the Soviets was to enact subversions and bring to power friendly or like-minded governments. Culture and religion also did not fare well with the communist ideology making a stable relationship within the region and exporting Marxism difficult within the Arab world. South Yemen lacked oil but within Aden, it was rich in socialist and Marxist passion.⁹ South Yemen had a natural deep water port, modern airfields courtesy of the former Royal Air Force tenants and decent infrastructure within the former colonial territories.

In 1977 President Jimmy Carter was sworn in as the 39th President of the US. As a US Naval Academy graduate and former submarine officer, President Carter had a unique background and perspective on the Cold War through his experience as a staff officer developing US Nuclear Submarine capabilities.¹⁰ His administration entered

⁸ US Central Command "*The United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia*" <http://www.centcom.mil/OPERATIONS-AND-EXERCISES/USMTM/> (accessed December 15, 2017).

⁹ Oil would not be discovered in Yemeni territories until the early 1980s.

¹⁰ President Carter, then LT Carter, US Navy, was selected as a staff member of Captain Hyman Rickover's nuclear submarine research team. Captain Rickover is considered the father of the US Nuclear Navy and architect of the first nuclear powered submarine.

office with a commitment for political and diplomatic engagement to ease Cold War tensions, and continued the period of Détente and Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). President Carter wanted to shift political attention to domestic issues, as well as further easing tensions with the Soviet Union and limiting dependence on Middle Eastern oil. But he understood competition with the Soviet Union nevertheless continued, and in 1978 National Security Strategy, he directed the US government to “counterbalance” Soviet power in Europe, the Middle East and Asia by capitalizing on political efforts, economic programs and military strength.¹¹ He hoped to outweigh Soviet gains in the developing world while advocating to disarm the Indian Ocean and reduce military expenditures.

¹¹ Christine Dodson, “PD/NSC-18: U.S. National Strategy, 1977”, Digital National Security Archive - DNSA: Document Records. (accessed August 20, 2017).

Chapter III

The Role of Saudi Arabia

To discuss the relations between the US and Yemen, from prior to unification up through today, it is crucial to understand the role of Saudi Arabia. A CIA memorandum from 1978 summarizes the US view on Saudi relations with North Yemen. In the memorandum which analyses the Saudi policies towards Ibrahim al-Hamdi and Saleh, the unnamed author states “any non-tribal government in Sana’a could not be trusted because it had too many ties with leftists and other opponents of Saudi Arabia.”¹² Furthermore, they opined that the Saudi policy was to maintain the Yemeni state financially viable but weak enough where the central government in Sana’a could not curb the power of northern tribes favorable to the Saudis.¹³ Mark Katz opined that the US and the West had no interest in allowing Yemen become a stronger independent state since the interests of Saudi Arabia far outweighed the interests of Yemen.¹⁴ Yemen’s internal policies and external relations are crucial to the kingdom’s security. Helen Lackner, Research Associate with the London Middle East Institute (LMEI), described Saudi Arabia’s policies over Yemen as effective “containment” through support of numerous opposition figures within Yemen while inhibiting Sana’a’s ability to effectively govern throughout its

¹² Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 238. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d238>

¹³ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 238.

¹⁴ Mark Katz. "Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security." *Middle East Policy* vol. 1, no. 1 (1992): 117-35.

territories.¹⁵ She cited the two states similar populations, long land border and Saudi fears of Yemeni political ideology influences on Saudi citizens as Saudi justifications to amplify Yemen as a strategic threat.¹⁶

Since the end of the Saudi-Yemeni War of 1934, where Saudi Arabia emerged as the victor, and the discovery of vast oil reserves in Saudi Arabia, whose demand increased every decade, both the Saudis and Yemenis progressed on two vastly different directions. A 1,300 mile longer border dispute between the two nations continues from the 1932 conflict; the longest disputed border in the Middle East. The discovery of oil allowed the Saudis to dramatically increase their wealth leaving Yemen behind, dependent on the Saudis. As the following chapters show, Saudi influence is evident through the vast majority of relations between the US and Yemen, and at times, Saudi concurrence or request was crucial to military or financial aid packages provided to the Yemen. The Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco), whose roots began in the 1930s oil discoveries, established a long and complicated relationship between the Saudis and the US.¹⁷ The percentage of Saudi profits grew from 25 percent in the 1950s to 50 percent by the 1970s and finally to 100 percent by the 1980s.¹⁸ Oil not only brought the Saudis great wealth, but a significant amount of power and influence on the US

¹⁵ Helen Lackner, London Middle East Institute, and British-Yemeni Society. *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*. SOAS Middle East Issues. (London: Saqi, 2014) Introduction.

¹⁶ Lackner, *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*, Introduction.

¹⁷ Chad Parker. *Making the Desert Modern : Americans, Arabs, and Oil on the Saudi Frontier, 1933-1973. Culture, Politics, and the Cold War*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2015. 15-18.

¹⁸ Parker, *Making the Desert Modern : Americans, Arabs, and Oil on the Saudi Frontier, 1933-1973*, 15-34.

diplomatic strategy in the region. This gave them vast influence over decisions and diplomacy concerning their southern Yemeni neighbors.

Saudi aid and the remittances from Yemenis employed within the kingdom is crucial to Yemeni survival. A significant number of Yemenis were employed in Saudi Arabia and remittances from workers in the kingdom accounted for significant revenue flow to Yemen. A report by the UN stated that from the mid-1970s through the 1980s, Saudi development aid and Yemeni remittances accounted for 30 percent more revenue than all other international assistance combined.¹⁹ Yemeni workers provided inexpensive unskilled labor for the Saudis and up through the expulsion in the early 1990s, they benefited from eased work permit access to Saudi Arabia. Unlike other foreign workers, Yemenis did not need Saudi sponsors and Yemeni business owners were allowed to operate within the kingdom without the need for a Saudi business partner.²⁰ According to Mark Katz, the 1.5 to 2 million Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia performed jobs Saudi Citizens were unwilling to perform themselves and suffered “harsh and discriminatory treatment” by the Saudis.²¹

The variance of GDP between the two states is staggering and highly disproportionate. Table 1 shows the difference in GDP between both states from 1977 through 1990 as reported by the UN. The difference in GDP between Saudi Arabia and Yemen is one of the greatest amongst Border States.²² It also accounted for the

¹⁹ US-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee. *Whither Saudi Arabian-Yemeni Relations? Interests and Implications for US Policies*. <https://ncusar.org/publications/Publications/1999-07-01-Whither-Saudi-Yemeni-Relations.pdf> (accessed August 20, 2017).

²⁰ Katz, *Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security*, 117-35.

²¹ Katz, *Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security*, 117-35.

significant influence and control the Saudis could wield over Yemeni politics and policies.

Table 1. Saudi Arabian and Yemeni GDP, 1977-1991.

YAR	1977	GDP	212
PDRY	1977	GDP	133
Saudi Arabia	1977	GDP	8,943
YAR	1978	GDP	226
PDRY	1978	GDP	157
Saudi Arabia	1978	GDP	9,136
YAR	1979	GDP	240
PDRY	1979	GDP	164
Saudi Arabia	1979	GDP	11,998
YAR	1980	GDP	260
PDRY	1980	GDP	195
Saudi Arabia	1980	GDP	16,599
YAR	1981	GDP	275
PDRY	1981	GDP	217
Saudi Arabia	1981	GDP	17,457
YAR	1982	GDP	300
PDRY	1982	GDP	251
Saudi Arabia	1982	GDP	13,625
YAR	1983	GDP	301
PDRY	1983	GDP	256
Saudi Arabia	1983	GDP	10,799
YAR	1984	GDP	298
PDRY	1984	GDP	264
Saudi Arabia	1984	GDP	9,439
YAR	1985	GDP	304
PDRY	1985	GDP	249
Saudi Arabia	1985	GDP	7,776
YAR	1986	GDP	307
PDRY	1986	GDP	210
Saudi Arabia	1986	GDP	6,199
YAR	1987	GDP	311
PDRY	1987	GDP	209
Saudi Arabia	1987	GDP	5,845

²² The World Bank. "World Bank Country and Lending Groups." https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519#High_income%7CThe (accessed November 8, 2017).

YAR	1988	GDP	315
PDRY	1988	GDP	213
Saudi Arabia	1988	GDP	5,784
Yemen	1989	GDP	285
YAR	1989	GDP	321
PDRY	1989	GDP	233
Saudi Arabia	1989	GDP	6,022
Yemen	1990	GDP	337
YAR	1990	GDP	385
PDRY	1990	GDP	268
Saudi Arabia	1990	GDP	7,180

Source: United Nations Statistics Division.

<http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=yemen&d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3A101%3BcurrID%3AUD%3BpcFlag%3A1%3BcrID%3A720%2C886%2C887>

Saudi political strength and its anxiety over what instability an uncontrolled southern neighbor could wield contributed significantly to US actions and policies regarding Yemen. As US diplomatic documents show, Saudi pressure amidst an insecure monarchy led to the deployment of US military aircraft, combatant vessels and surveillance aircraft in the late 1970s, at a time when the US administration was weary of involvement in any Middle East conflict. Through the diplomatic messages and policies that follow in subsequent paragraphs, the role and involvement of Saudi Arabia in Yemeni affairs is evident. Throughout the Cold War, the Saudis wanted a North Yemen weak enough that it would not threaten the stability of the kingdom and just strong enough to keep Sana'a from following into the Soviet sphere of influence.²³

²³ Katz, *Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security*, 117-35.

Chapter IV

Political Landscape

Relations between the US, Soviet Union and Yemen began prior to the Second World War. Both the US and USSR established relationships with the Yemen imamate which would continue after the establishment of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). In 1951, the State Department defined US policy towards Yemen:

“Since Yemen is a primitive country which needs development of all kinds, we desire to encourage its progressive and orderly advancement politically, economically and socially. The geographical position of Yemen, situated at the southern narrows of the Red Sea, gives it a certain strategic value which we wish to remain in friendly hands.”²⁴

The policy came a few years after the US formally recognized the Yemeni government and as the effects of the Cold War began to expand throughout the region. In order to maintain a positive enduring relationship, the policy stated that US diplomats would:

1. Prevent communist expansion into Yemen
2. Support the development of the Yemeni economy
3. Support Yemen in disputes through intermediary counsel
4. Respect the sovereignty of Yemen
5. Promote modernization through the Point IV Assistance Program
6. Encourage American businesses to establish interests in Yemen
7. Extend financial banking support

²⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume V, The Near East and Africa; eds. John A. Bernbaum, Paul Claussen, Joan M. Lee, Carl N. Raether, Lisle A. Rose, Charles S. Sampson, David H. Stauffer (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1193-1198.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v05/d682>

8. Establish cultural exchanges and distribution of American media to Yemen
9. Foster philanthropic exchange (Limited to non-religious)²⁵

It is important to note that within the policy, the authors identified that there were no oil discoveries at the time in Yemen, but communications should be made to allow for American oil prospectors to survey and search for the possibility of energy or mineral extraction in the country.²⁶ For the majority of the Cold War period, US policy did not stray too far from the 1951 objective. Most US diplomatic efforts were focused on Yemen's more powerful and mineral rich neighbors. Significant US diplomatic efforts with Yemen, other than the efforts to move Yemenite Jews, would only come during times of crisis.

The US Department of State wanted to ensure its emerging relationship with Yemen would not be tarnished from the inception Citing Arab States opposition to US policy towards Israeli-Palestinian issues.²⁷ The migration of Yemenite Jews from Yemen to Israel, the United Kingdom and the US was one area of direct diplomacy that occurred between the US and the governments in North Yemen and the unified Republic of Yemen. It was a vast humanitarian effort that successfully relocated thousands of Yemeni Jews over the decades.

²⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume V, The Near East and Africa, 1193-1198.

²⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume V, The Near East and Africa, 1193-1198. US Department of State suggested the use of American oil exploration companies as an impartial intermediary to explore along Yemen's border. At the time, the Yemeni Government was critical of the British whom contested control over Shabwa where they felt there were oil deposits.

²⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume V, The Near East and Africa, 1193-1198.

The Yemenite Jews

The Yemenite Jews have a rich history that predates Islam and their story is overshadowed by the multiple conflicts, process towards unification, terrorism and other events that surround discussion about Yemen. The establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 brought about a long standing conflict between the Israeli and Arab states. From 1949 through 1950, Alaska Airlines alone evacuated 49,000 Yemenite Jews from British military bases outside of Aden on 430 flights.²⁸ Figure 4 displays an image of an Alaskan Air aircraft in Yemen loading Yemenite Jewish passenger's en route to Israel from Aden. A small number of Jewish families remained and in between 1988 and 1992, Operation Esther worked to move remaining Jewish families from Yemen. Dr. Hayim Tawil, William Wolf, Pierre Goloubinoff worked alongside Dr. Abdel Karim Al-Iryani, Yemen's Minister of Foreign Affairs, US Ambassador Charles Dunbar and his staff to allow for the free movement of remaining Jewish families from Yemen.²⁹ Ambassador Dunbar recalled that as he departed the US to begin his appointment in Sana'a his only mandate from the Department of State was to be cautious and attentive to the Jewish safety, security and migration question with the Yemeni government; an issue which was one of the most significant diplomatic efforts during his tenure as Ambassador to the Republic of Yemen.³⁰ He credited the leadership of Dr. Abdel Karim Al-Iryani who

²⁸ Caitlin Goettler, "From the archives: How Alaska Airlines evacuated 49,000 Yemenite Jews to Israel 'on the wings of eagles'" Alaska Airlines History Blog, Alaska Airlines, September 22, 2017, <https://blog.alaskaair.com/alaska-airlines/history/on-eagles-wings/> (accessed on January 20, 2018).

²⁹ Hayim Tawil, Steven Miodownik and Pierre Goloubinoff, *Operation Esther: Opening the Door for the Last Jews of Yemen* (New York, NY: Belkis Press, 1998).

³⁰ Charles Franklin Dunbar, US Ambassador to Yemen 1988-1991, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 9, 2017.

continued to work with the US, in relative secrecy to avoid public knowledge of the efforts, even while relations were souring because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait crisis.³¹ The relatively silent work of US diplomats and select Yemeni government officials continued past Ambassador Dunbar's assignment and into the following administration of President Clinton. As of 2015, about 50 Yemeni Jews remained in Yemen, mainly in Sana'a but their fate since the onset of the most recent Civil War is questionable.

The USSR and Yemen




Figure 4. Operation on Eagles Wings. <https://blog.alaskaair.com/alaska-airlines/history/on-eagles-wings/>
The USSR and Yemen

The Soviet Union had initiated relations with the Yemeni government in 1928 when the Soviet-Yemeni Friendship and Trade Treaty was signed but had little to no relations with

³¹ Dunbar, US Ambassador to Yemen 1988-1991, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 9, 2017.

Yemen since the treaty was last renewed in 1939.³² The Soviet Union began a more aggressive approach to foster influence within the Yemeni States as early as 1962 and provided substantial aid during the North Yemen Civil War. Soviet support amounted to military equipment and advisors for Republican Forces, while they also equipped Egyptian forces heavily engaged in the campaign. In a May 1963 report, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) estimated there were about 700 Soviet economic advisors and construction personnel active in North Yemen.³³ Furthermore, the CIA described the Soviet role in North Yemen's development as significant, citing active projects to build airfield's, ports, roads, cement plants and other key infrastructure in cities such as al-Hudaydah and Sana'a.³⁴

North Yemen Civil War

The Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen collapsed in 1962 and the Yemen Arab Republic which encompassed North Yemen was established. Subsequently the new state was consumed by a civil war from 1962 to 1968 that involved regional powers. As noted in Dr Asher Orkaby's book *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68*, the Yemen Civil War was a conflict where "Egypt and Saudi Arabia were joined by over a dozen countries and organizations in an international civil

³² The US-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship was signed on May 4, 1946,

³³ Central Intelligence Agency. "*The Soviet Presence in Yemen*" CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00429A001100040006-5.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2017).

³⁴ The CIA report spells al-Hudaydah as Hudaydah and Sana'a as Sana.

war that served as a microcosm of global tensions.”³⁵ By the end of the conflict, Egyptian Arab Nationalism and expansionist ideals began their demise and Saudi Arabia became the leading power in the Arabian Peninsula. The US had little interest in Yemen or the ensuing civil war although the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) did prepare mobilization plans for fighters, bombers, reconnaissance aircraft, tankers and a Carrier Strike Group which could be employed for strikes if need be to protect the southern border of Saudi Arabia.³⁶ US interest would grow gradually after the end of the Yemen Civil War, the independence of Southern Yemen and its growing relationship with the Soviet Union.

South Yemen

The Arab Israeli Conflict, which grew ever more complicated as the decades passed, weakened US influence and power amongst the Arab states. For the Soviets, this amounted to an opportunity to enter and influence Arab countries who otherwise had no reason to ally with a Marxist ideology. Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov, former Soviet diplomat and scholar, described the US Middle East foreign policy approach in the 1970s as a balance between strategic importance and available oil resources.³⁷ They understood the complications the US faced in balancing priorities in the Middle East and looked for

³⁵ Orkaby, Asher, *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68*, Oxford Studies in International History, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017, 2.

³⁶ Orkaby. *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68*. 3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVIII, Near East; ed. Nina Noring (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995), Document 177. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d177>

³⁷ Yevgeny Primakov, "USA: Policy of Destabilization in the Middle East." *International Affairs*, 1984, 39-47. Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov served as Chairman of the USSR from June 1989- March 1990, Foreign Intelligence Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) from 1991-1996, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs from January 1996- September 1998 and Prime Minister of Russia from September 1998- May 1999.

ways to capitalize on US shortcomings. The Soviets could replenish weapons stores destroyed through years of conflict, while filling Arab airfields and ports with advisors, trainers and diplomats. Arab states could enjoy access to new sophisticated military equipment with little to give other than strategic access. Inexpensive Soviet weapons filled Arab inventories while the Soviet military expanded its strategic reach to an ever more critical region of the world.

A potential regional ally arrived with the independence of South Yemen. At first the CIA did not anticipate the relationship that formed between the Soviets and South Yemen. The CIA assessed that South Yemen was in desperate need of aid upon independence, but avoided Soviet assistance in order to not lose potential British assistance.³⁸ Additionally, the Soviets were actively supporting the Republican Forces in the 1962-1968 North Yemen Civil War with equipment and advisement, which the Republicans eventually won. The Soviets had gambled a great deal of equipment and support for the North Yemeni Civil War with the hope that “progressive” Republican Forces would topple the Royalists paving the way for a friendly client state in a region otherwise indifferent to the communist state or ideology.³⁹ The Republican’s win ushered in a new era for Yemen. Relations with the Soviets continued throughout the Cold War, but what the Soviets truly desired was a true client state, and they found that in Aden.

The Soviet Union recognized South Yemen shortly after its independence from the British Empire and by 1968 Soviet military advisors, equipment and naval visits had

³⁸ Central Intelligence Agency. “*The Situation in Yemen and South Yemen and the Soviet Role.*” CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A003000400001-8.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2017).

³⁹ Central Intelligence Agency. *The Situation in Yemen and South Yemen and the Soviet Role.*

begun to arrive in Aden. The British attempt to create the Federation of South Arabia in South Yemen failed and by 1967, power was handed over the NLF who had defeated rival factions for control of the new state.⁴⁰ Lackner described the NLF as a group of “obscure young rural people” aligned with left of Arab Nationalist movements, whose left wing ousted all remaining rivals within two years of independence.⁴¹ The new South Yemeni left leaning government was eager to ally itself with the Soviet Union potentially benefitting from infrastructure programs, financial aid and military hardware. The Soviet Navy conducted its first patrol of the Indian Ocean in 1968, and visited the Port of Aden for resupply and a goodwill mission.⁴² Aden provided the Soviets a natural deep water port with built maritime facilities and an active oil refinery left over from the British period. Soviet influence and Marxist ideology grew quickly throughout South Yemen further eroding relations with the west. Formal diplomatic relations between the US and South Yemen lasted just under two years. By 1975 President Gerald Ford’s administration removed South Yemen’s designation as a developing nation for economic systems of preference.⁴³ In the coming decade, the CIA noted that the Soviet Union considered South Yemen as “the model third world state” and its most vital client state in

⁴⁰ Lackner, *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*. Introduction.

⁴¹ Lackner, *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*. Introduction.

⁴² Central Intelligence Agency. “*Soviet Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean*.” CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R002200020002-8.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2017).

⁴³ Gerald R. Ford: “Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on Designation of Developing Countries for Purposes of the Generalized System of Preferences”, March 24, 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4799>, (accessed July 20, 2017). Gabon, Somalia and Uganda were also removed in the same Presidential determination.

the region.⁴⁴ The Soviet Union also had similar military arrangements, weapons deals and cooperation with the government in Sana'a, but the new left leaning South Yemeni government appeased Soviet ambitions for a closer political arrangement in a region which was quickly becoming strategically valuable.

The Soviets did not establish any long term military facilities, airfields or naval bases in Southern Yemen but Soviet forces did utilize established Yemeni facilities in Aden for training, and as logistical hubs for force projection throughout the region. Berbera, Somalia housed the only permanent Soviet military force in the region able to provide limited repair and logistical support for deployed vessels and aircraft, but the Port of Aden and the government of South Yemen was more suitable to long term Soviet interests. In 1974, the CIA observed an increase of Soviet Naval activity in the Port of Aden, to include the servicing of the Helicopter Landing Ship Leningrad.⁴⁵ Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, head of the Soviet Navy visited Aden in 1974 to further cooperation between both nations. Gorshkov's visit was significant when you take into account Soviet Naval Warfare Doctrine as compared to that of the US Navy. The US Navy has the advantage of vast coastlines with year round accessible ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as forward deployed warships in Asia, the Indian Ocean and Europe.⁴⁶ The position of the Soviet Union limited its access to year round ports due to

⁴⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. *"South Yemen- USSR: Outlook for the Relationship."* CIA.gov. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000681975.pdf (accessed on July 20, 2017).

⁴⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. *"Soviet Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean."* CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R002200020002-8.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2017). Soviet Helicopter Landing Ship's served as the Flag Ships of Soviet Anti-Submarine Warfare Task Forces and were deployed to defend Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines. Only two of these vessels were built for the Soviet Navy.

⁴⁶ Craig Symonds. *The U.S. Navy: A Concise History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

weather, and therefore Gorshkov devised a different strategy which he described in *Sea Power of the State*.⁴⁷ Gorshkov wrote

Concentration of groupings of forces and disposing them in a theater such as a manner that they will have superiority of position over the enemy...providing of facilities in the sea and oceanic theaters of military operations...and a base system appropriate to their mission.

Aden's location and established facilities were adequate to meet the measures written by Gorshkov. During 1977 a Soviet Landing Ship Tank (LST) amphibious naval vessel operated from Aden to support weapons and supply shipments to Ethiopian forces in Africa.⁴⁸ In 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter requested an assessment from the CIA comparing subversive activities of the Soviets, Cubans and East Germans from 1977 through 1979. Regarding South Yemen, the CIA assessed that in 1979 there were about 1,000 Soviet military advisors as well as about 600 economic advisors active in the country. Additionally, the Soviets provided South Yemen about \$400 million in military aid and \$200 million in economic aid over the decade.⁴⁹ The Soviets had increased their overall presence in South Yemen, established stronger political ties with the ruling Socialist government and increased the use of military ports and airfields to supplement their activities in the Indian Ocean and forward deploy forces active in Oman and East Africa.⁵⁰ In 1979, the New York Times

⁴⁷ Sergey Gorshkov. *The Sea Power of the State*. Elsevier Science, 1979. 279

⁴⁸ Central Intelligence Agency. "Soviet Amphibious Forces: Tasks and Capabilities in General War and Peace." CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1979-06-01.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2017).

⁴⁹ Central Intelligence Agency. "Communist Intervention Comparison." CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81b00401r000200020004-7> (accessed July 15, 2017).

⁵⁰ Central Intelligence Agency. "Communist Intervention Comparison."

reported that a US Navy Destroyer sighted an Echo II Class Soviet submarine and tender entering the Port of Aden.⁵¹ The ability for the Soviet Navy to safely utilize ports for potential resupply and rearmament significantly strengthened their naval position and threaten US capabilities throughout the Indian Ocean and up through to the Mediterranean. Finally, the CIA believed the Soviets and Southern Yemen shared a mutual interest in supporting progressive forces and movements in the region.⁵² Any indication of Yemeni support for socialist or Marxist movements within the Arabian Peninsula directly threatened Saudi Arabia.

As a comparison during the same period, the Soviets maintained about 1500-2000 military advisors in Afghanistan, 1400 military advisors in Angola, 1300 military advisors in Ethiopia and 475 military advisors in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.⁵³ In Figure 5, CIA analysis shows that about 20 percent of Communist Military Personnel present in developing countries were operating in South Yemen with a smaller contingent operating in North Yemen. While the numbers are not a complete analysis of the complete mission sets each Soviet contingent had in each country, they are significant when considering South Yemen only had a population of about 2.5 million at the time, and a standing army of about 25,000 troops.⁵⁴

⁵¹ "U.S. Asserts a Soviet Submarine Has Entered South Yemen Port." New York Times (1923-Current File) (New York, N.Y.), August 06, 1979. Echo Class II submarines are nuclear powered boats designed to carry and deploy anti- ship cruise missiles capable of destroying US based aircraft carriers.

⁵² Central Intelligence Agency. *"Communist Intervention Comparison."*

⁵³ Central Intelligence Agency. *"Communist Intervention Comparison."*

⁵⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. *"North and South Yemen: Comparative Military Capabilities."* CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88T00096R000800980002-6.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2017).

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/09 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000200020004-7

SECRET

25X1

Estimated Number of Communist Military
Personnel Present in Less Developed
Countries Outside Sub-Saharan Africa
(as of July 1979)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Cuba</u>	<u>East Germany</u>	<u>Other</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>10,990</u>	<u>8,470</u>	<u>1,375</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>845</u>
<u>North Africa</u>	<u>2,935</u>	<u>2,310</u>	<u>215</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>410</u>
Algeria	1,015	1,000	15 ¹	-	-
Libya	1,910	1,300	200 ¹	NA	410
Morocco	10	10 ¹	-	-	-
<u>Latin America</u>	<u>160</u>	<u>150</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
Guyana	10	-	10 ¹	-	-
Peru	150	150 ¹	-	-	-
<u>Middle East</u>	<u>6,355</u>	<u>4,560</u>	<u>1,150</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>345</u>
Iran	5	5 ¹	-	-	-
Iraq	1,380	1,100 ¹	150 ¹	NA	130 ¹
Kuwait	5	5 ¹	-	-	-
North Yemen	155	150	-	-	5 ¹
South Yemen	2,300	1,000 ²	1,000	300	-
Syria	2,510	2,300	-	-	210 ¹
<u>South Asia</u>	<u>1,540</u>	<u>1,450</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>90</u>
Afghanistan	1,300	1,300 ³	-	-	-
Bangladesh	50	-	-	-	50 ¹
India	150	150 ¹	-	-	-
Pakistan	40	-	-	-	40 ¹

¹ 1978 estimate.² Increased from 500 present in 1978.³ Increased from 700 present in 1978.

ER M 79-10459
9 August 1979

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/09 : CIA-RDP81B00401R000200020004-7

SECRET

25X1

Figure 5. Estimated Number of Communist Military Personnel Present in Less Developed Countries Outside of Sub Saharan Africa as of July 1979. Central Intelligence Agency.

"Communist Intervention Comparison."

<https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81b00401r000200020004-7> (accessed July 15, 2017)

The US and North Yemen

The 1970s were a difficult period for US foreign policy. The conflict in Vietnam brought upon significant domestic and international implications for the US. The defeat of US policy and military might in Southeast Asia significantly weakened US image and threatened its ability to influence strategically significant actors in key regions around the world. The ability to project power and contain communist expansion through the developing world was in question. Further exacerbating US foreign policy was the dramatic increase in petroleum imports into the US during the 1970s. As Figure 6 depicts, the US increased petroleum imports from about 3 million barrels a day to about 8.5 million barrels a day, and doubled its reliance on oil imports from Persian Gulf states between 1970 and 1980. North Yemen restored diplomatic relations with the US in 1972 after a five year hiatus due to the 1967 War. Saudi and North Yemeni relations had begun to improve since 1972 as well and had begun coordinating the accession of US weapons for Yemeni security, but the transfer was slow and complicated relations.




Figure 6. US Petroleum Imports: Total and from OPEC, Persian Gulf and Canada 1960-2016 in millions of barrels per day. US Energy Information Administration, Monthly Energy Review, Tables 3.3a and 3.3d, March 2017, preliminary data for 2016. <https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=p&s=mcrimul&f=m>

As the decade progressed, US relations with Middle Eastern partner nations faced many diplomatic challenges. President Jimmy Carter entered the White House at the most critical time in US and Middle East Relations. The pro US Iranian regime was on the brink of collapse, relations with Saudi Arabia were sour at best, and Afghanistan was under the sphere of Soviet influence which continued to spread throughout the region. In April 1977, The US Embassy in Sana'a reported that President al-Hamdi was contemplating a Soviet offer for the acquisition of MiG-21 fighter aircraft after the Saudis failed to firmly commit to providing US F-5 fighter aircraft for the Yemeni Air Force.⁵⁵ Citing the need to strengthen the Yemeni Air Force for purposes of internal

⁵⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 230. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d230>

security, al-Hamdi wanted to pressure the Saudis to provide the needed military aircraft.⁵⁶ Pressuring the US by threatening to go to the Soviet Union for needed equipment or funding became a common tactic employed by Yemeni leaders for the remainder of the Cold War.

Citing a potential loss of influence in the Middle East, the Carter Administration took steps early in his administration to increase security assistance programs throughout the region. During a March 1977 address to Congress, President Carter outlined his strategy to advance US security interest programs for the region. President Carter's administration increased military aid to \$284.6 million, added \$35.7 million in military leadership education, financed \$2.2 billion in foreign military sales and \$1.9 billion for states crucial in assurance of US international security goals.⁵⁷ The military aid and Bilateral Development Assistance aid programs requested by President Carter's administration were a 20 percent increase over the previous year. The Presidents' administration wanted to impede the deterioration of the US position in the Middle East and was willing to increase foreign aid spending to reverse its declining relevance.

Diplomatic relations with the US's most important Arab strategic partner were strained in the latter half of the 1970s. During an April 22, 1978 meeting, Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia vented his frustrations with the US Ambassador in Riyadh about failing US leadership, the growing Soviet threat in the Arabian Peninsula and the lack of

⁵⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 230.

⁵⁷ Jimmy Carter: "Foreign Assistance Programs Message to the Congress," March 17, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7188>.

confidence in US defense of the Kingdoms sovereignty.⁵⁸ The Saudis were worried about the stability of the Arabian Peninsula, and significantly concerned about the events at their southern border. Earlier in April, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had written President Carter of Saudi willingness for the US to open diplomatic relations with Southern Yemen and open an embassy in Aden.⁵⁹ US diplomatic relations with Southern Yemen could further develop stability in the region and potentially sway the government in Aden from reliance on the Soviet Union. The North Yemeni state stability was weak, and conflict was common, but now there was a greater array of weapons in North Yemen, Southern Yemen was better trained and equipped with Soviet hardware and the Saudis were nervous.

Saudi concerns over its South Arabian neighbors began to grow significantly shortly after the establishment of Southern Yemen. At first, the threat came from the potential of subversive left leaning groups to spread throughout the peninsula, imaginably setting the stage to destabilize the conservative monarchy and the favorable but weak government in Sana'a. By 1972 the Soviets had established the Aden School of Socialist Sciences for members of the National Democratic Front (NDF).⁶⁰ Cuban, East German and Soviet advisors were stationed through Southern Yemen developing military and

⁵⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 171. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d171>

⁵⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 240. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d240>

⁶⁰ Laurie Mylroie and Rand Corporation. *Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges*. A Rand Note; N-2052-AF. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1983.

government programs. The Saudis feared that leftist trained revolutionaries could spill across the border and threaten the monarchy; a fear that was never realized, but nonetheless, the constant instability in Sana'a heightened the kingdom's suspicions.

The latter half of the 1970s became a turbulent period for the fragile stability of North Yemen and subsequently trigger a dynamic shift in US policy for Southern Arabia. In the span of eight months, two Northern Yemeni Presidents were assassinated. Ibrahim al-Hamdi was assassinated on October 11, 1977 and his successor, Ahmad bin Hussein al-Ghashmi was assassinated on June 24, 1978. Since coming to power in 1974 through a successful military coup, al-Hamdi worked to strengthen the central government, weaken the influence of powerful tribes from within government, and initiate the first true modernization of the military.⁶¹ Dr. Robert D. Burrowes, Professor Emeritus of the Political Science Department and the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington, wrote that the "stubbornness and impetuosity" exhibited by al-Hamdi in domestic and international relations disturbed the Saudi government; they were concerned about his efforts to strengthen central government, weaken Saudi favored tribes and make concessions with leftist opposition.⁶² Al-Hamdi was irritated at Saudi delays in providing weapons deliveries and complained directly to the US while contemplating restrictions on Yemeni worker emigrations to Saudi Arabia due to continuous complaints of mistreatment of Yemeni workers. Regarding the delays in weapons, Burrowes wrote that "a joke circulating in Sana'a at the time had the Saudis agreeing to the sale of tanks to the YAR only upon invention of a tank that could drive

⁶¹ Lackner, *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*, Introduction.

⁶² Robert Burrowes, *The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962-1986. Westview Special Studies on the Middle East*. Boulder: London: Westview Press; Croom Helm, 1987.

and shoot south and not north.”⁶³ Al-Hamdi was a popular leader who had grand visions for North Yemen but his efforts to consolidate power and weaken the structure of tribal power favorable to the Saudis led to his demise.

A November 1977 telegram from the US Embassy in Sana’a to the Department of State requested a significant increase in US policy focus and a dynamic shift in US commitment to thwart instability within the Arabian Peninsula. US diplomats in Sana’a commented that the two Yemen’s had become “major and unwanted preoccupations of Middle East politics and US diplomacy,” and the stability of North Yemen was critical to the overall stability of Saudi Arabia, the Horn of Africa and containment of Soviet expansion outside of Aden.⁶⁴ They concluded by stating Yemen was a “strategic piece of the peninsular puzzle,” and required serious and committed attention from US leaders.⁶⁵ South Yemen remained an impoverished state in the late 1970s and the grip of power by the more radical Marxists was not certain, but it was an excellent client state for the Soviets in the Arab world and they were not willing to lose their access on the peninsula. The Saudis remained suspicious of Aden’s attempts to export radical Marxism throughout the region, beginning with North Yemen where they maintained tribal support.

Two weeks after al-Hamdi’s assassination, US Ambassador to North Yemen Thomas Scotes met with al-Ghashmi to discuss stability and ensure that he followed al-Hamdi’s policies of close ties to the US and Saudi Arabia. The US reiterated its financial

⁶³ Burrowes, *The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962-1986*, 67-85.

⁶⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 235 <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d235>

⁶⁵ *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula*, Document 235.

and military support to North Yemen and discussed the modernization of the Yemeni Air Force while al-Ghashmi discussed his future political vision which included the democratization of North Yemen ensuring that “rule was not dependent on one man’s existence.”⁶⁶ Five days after al-Ghashmi’s assassination, North Yemeni leaders met with Joseph Twinam, a US Diplomat who traveled to Yemen, on a fact finding mission at the behest of Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders. US leaders were becoming increasingly concerned about the stability in North Yemen and wanted to ascertain what additional actions the US could take to avert a potential government collapse. North Yemeni leaders voiced their concerns over the fragile stability of the Sana’a government and of the growing Soviet threat emerging from Aden.⁶⁷ North Yemeni leaders feared terrorism and political subversion from Southern Yemen within their territory and had a dire need for a reassertion of support from the US.⁶⁸ In Twinam’s June 29, 1978 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, he described the North Yemeni need for support as “desperate” and pressure should be placed on the Saudi government to implement the military supply program which had been previously agreed upon, including the transfer of F-5B fighter aircraft whose need he described as

⁶⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 234. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d234>

⁶⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 246. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d246>

⁶⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 246.

“urgent.”⁶⁹ This was an additional attempt validate a US-Saudi combined policy to support Northern Yemen.

By June 1978, the Saudi government had given up on diplomatic methods to sway influence over Southern Yemen and had begun discussions on potential military solutions to confront tensions. The Yemeni Coup and assassination of North Yemen’s President Ahmad al-Ghashmi exacerbated Saudi concern that instability in the Yemen’s would spill over into the Kingdom. The Soviets now had favorable presence in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Horn of Africa and South Yemen, in effect encircling the Arab world. Gary Sick of the National Security Council (NSC) voiced these concerns in a memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski.⁷⁰ The NSC’s most pressing worries were the stability of Saudi Arabia, and curbing any potential Saudi military action on South Yemen which could destabilize the entire region. The NSC did not view Southern Yemen as a significant threat to the Saudis or the region, even with its Soviet ties. The NSC cited that South Yemen was too weak and poverty stricken to threaten neighbors and too isolated to provide a base of influence to any neighbors. Additionally, even with its Marxist government and ties to the Soviet Union, South Yemen had still not increased significant basing rights for Soviet ships or military aircraft, something that frustrated the government in Moscow.⁷¹ Saudi military

⁶⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 246.

⁷⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 245. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d245>

⁷¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 245.

action could destabilize South Yemen, potentially spill into North Yemen and quickly affect the entire region.

The Saudi monarchy did not seem to share the same opinion as the NSC regarding the growing communist threat within the region. In an August 1978 letter from Saudi Arabia's King Khalid to President Carter, he stressed the considerable concentration and activities of communist forces in southern Arabia, and remarked that "these greedy objectives must be only too clear to Your Excellency as they use North Yemen as only a passageway leading to their real target."⁷² The King stressed that the monarchy had made great strides to distance North Yemen from Soviet military equipment and advisory aid and was calling on the US to do more to supplement what became a military imbalance with South Yemen.⁷³ Even as the government in Sana'a had begun to lessen reliance on Soviet hardware, the Soviets continued to offer new equipment and the Saudis wished to counter that with US hardware, advisement and financial aid packages. King Khalid concluded the letter by requesting President Carter approve outfitting North Yemen with the following:⁷⁴

1. 12 F-5E Fighter Aircraft with associated arms, ammunition and equipment
2. 2 C-130 Transport Aircraft
3. 64 M-50 Tanks

⁷² Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 253. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d253>. In King Khalid's letter he identified the concentration of communist forces as those of Cuba, the Soviet Union and East Germany.

⁷³ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 253.

⁷⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 253.

4. 100 M-113 Armored Personnel Carriers

5. American Military Mission of Advisors and Technical Experts

This arrangement was different from previous requests. This time the Saudis requested the US finance half of the package which was estimated to cost about \$300 million dollars.⁷⁵ Brzezinski advised President Carter that the US would not be able to share the financing of the aid package, but suggested to provide the Saudis initial approval to the equipment requested, offer alternatives to the tanks and Armored Personnel Carriers and agree to provide US training in North Yemen.⁷⁶ \$300 million in weapons aid plus trainers and advisors was a significant request in 1978 plus a controversial one on the heels of the Vietnam War. The Saudis needed a reassurance of US commitment to the security of the kingdom and such a request would place pressure on the administration to validate their pledge. The US was still reeling from the domestic political effects of the Vietnam War and a significant package that potentially included the deployment of US advisors would not be met with great enthusiasm amongst the US population.

The equipment the Saudis requested was also advanced at the time; similar airframes and armored equipment were being fielded by the Iranian's, Saudis and Turkish which were much better equipped, trained and in a financial state to maintain and field equipment which in 1978 was considered modern and sophisticated.⁷⁷ The F-5 was

⁷⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 256. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d256>. Per the US Department of Labor Statistics CPI Inflation Calculator, \$300 million US dollars in September 1978 would equate to \$1,112,138,346.00 in November 2017.

⁷⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 256.

⁷⁷ Helen Chapin Matz and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Turkey: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs.,

designed by the Northrop Corporation in the US as a low cost fighter with similar capabilities to other western based and Soviet platforms, but even its low cost was more than North Yemen could afford to operate and maintain. F-5 fighter aircraft are more than capable to defend North Yemeni airspace, but the acquisition alone would not solve immediate security concerns. Adapting an Air Force to new sophisticated aircraft takes significant amounts of time and resources. Fighter aircraft are costly and require trained technicians, specialized airfields, specialized equipment, and significant amounts of fuel and ground equipment to operate. In 2008, the US Navy estimated that the average cost for the F-5E, a model similar to that provided to North Yemen, was about \$3,910.00 per flight hour.⁷⁸ The C-130s, tanks and armored personnel carriers also required similar logistical and costly needs. The sophisticated military equipment could not provide immediate security to North Yemens territory and government, but the approval provided the Saudis an assurance of US commitment to regional security.

Saudi pressure due their own insecurities continued to mount and the US did not want to lose political position in the region, nor see Arab states act alone against the perceived communist aggression. Within a week of the King's letter, US officials met with the Prime Minister of North Yemen. Brzezinski recommended to President Carter

U.S. G.P.O, 1996. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/95049612/>. (Accessed February 23, 2018). Glenn E Curtis, Eric J Hooglund, and Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Iran: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O, 2008. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2008011784/>. (Accessed February 23, 2018). Helen Chapin Metz, and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Saudi Arabia: a country study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O, 1993. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/93028506/>. (Accessed February 23, 2018.)

⁷⁸ Robert DeGuzman, Jeffery Brown, Thomas Fulford, Jesse Porter, and Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca. "Cost Benefit Analysis of the Department of the Navy's F-5 Tiger II Contract." 2003. The estimated hourly flight hour cost is based on 2008 monetary rate.

that North Yemen be provided with \$50 million dollars in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits over a period of time noting that North Yemen would never have the capital to repay a traditional loan for such a significant weapons package.⁷⁹ He also cautioned this was the best option at the moment and would more than likely be an accepted solution by the Saudis, but it was imperative to be forthcoming about the inability to provide grant financing.⁸⁰ The seemingly inconsequential country was now at the center of US policy in thwarting communist expansion into the Middle East and efforts to appease the Saudis while attempting to establish a policy with a state in disarray were becoming increasingly difficult.

A few weeks prior to the Kings letter, Ali Abdullah Saleh, an army military officer, was elected as President of North Yemen. Saleh ruled Yemen for over three decades, through unification, the first Gulf War and the US Global War on Terror. He became an instrumental figure in Yemen, outlasting previous leaders, solidifying power amongst a difficult tribal and fractured landscape. The Saudis viewed Saleh with caution, as they did with most Yemeni leaders, and attempt to ensure they maintained influence over the impoverished state. Saleh learned from the limitations of his predecessors, especially al-Hamdi, and coupled favorable policies of his predecessor with others which would secure his power. Helen Lackner wrote that unlike al-Hamdi who pushed to reform government through promoting nationalism and weakening tribal influences, Saleh

⁷⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 256.

⁸⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 256.

adopted policies favoring his Hashid tribal coalition.⁸¹ His military roots and participation in previous coups gave him a strong power base amongst military officers and tribal elites. For the next three decades, he worked patiently to solidify his central power, weaken the YSP after unification and pit the US and USSR against each other for influence as he played a delicate diplomatic gamble for military aid.

On August 29, 1978, Prime Minister Abdul Aziz Abd al-Ghani met with Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, National Security Advisor Brzezinski, and with undersecretaries from the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). The high level meeting was coordinated to promote increased bilateral US and North Yemeni relations, discuss relations with other regional states, work to increase direct US military and financial cooperation and confer about South Yemeni and Soviet activities in Southern Arabia.⁸² The North Yemeni delegation expressed its interest in joint ventures with the US in oil and mineral exploration as well as increased educational opportunity grants; as a measure of good will, the Prime Minister expressed the cancellation of cultural cooperation and education programs offered by the Soviet Union.⁸³ But the Prime Minister's most urgent request was again weapons.

The Camp David Accords of September 1978 eased some tensions within the Middle East and returned credibility to the US within the region as a reliable partner.⁸⁴

⁸¹ Lackner, *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*, Introduction.

⁸² Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 254. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d254>

⁸³ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 254.

⁸⁴ Yoram Meital *"Egypt-Israel since the Camp David Accords and Peace Treaty"* Middle East Institute Viewpoints Special Edition: The Legacy of Camp David: 1979-2009, 2010, 45-47.

The US Department of State took advantage of the diplomatic victory as a means to strengthen the US political alliance with Saudi Arabia. The accords did not involve Saudi Arabia, but it did serve as a means to convey that the US was committed to regional security and stability. President Carter penned a message to King Khalid discussing the accords and positive strides made by US diplomacy. The message was delivered by the US Ambassador to King Khalid, the Saudi Foreign Minister and Second Deputy Prime Minister who quickly tuned the meeting into a discussion on the Yemen's and Soviet activity in the Arabian Peninsula.⁸⁵ King Khalid questioned if there was consideration to his military weapons request letter to President Carter from August 1978. He further described the Soviet threat as a "circle of fire closing in on us."⁸⁶ Saudi paranoia was placing increased pressure on the US to act in some manner. Either through increased military aid or through some other means to decrease potential subversion within the kingdom that could be exported from South Yemen or through South Yemeni allied tribes within North Yemen.

By early 1979 Saudi pressure had turned into overt criticism of US inaction against communist aggression in the Arabian Peninsula and throughout the Middle East. The Saudis criticized continued US analyses and observation of the Soviet threat and demanded a stern commitment to defense of the kingdom.⁸⁷ On January 14, 1979, Prince

⁸⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 255. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d255>

⁸⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 255.

⁸⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 177. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d177>

Saud met with representatives of the US Embassy and the DOD to discuss agreement of a renewed security policy prior to Crown Prince Fahd's visit with President Carter.⁸⁸ He further emphasized that "analysis" of the communist threat had been continuously conducted since the administration of President Johnson, the situation for the Kingdom was extremely dangerous and that it was the time for the US to act.⁸⁹ The Saudis also understood their responsibility in the trilateral relationship ensuring North Yemen's security and stability but demanded actionable results from the US.

Saudi concerns were understandable even if they were outside of US analysis or belief of communist encroachment and capability in the region. Iran was slowly collapsing and even if it did not fall within the Soviet sphere of influence, it was a significant shift in regional political dynamics. Iran had been a principle opponent to Marxist expansion and cooperated with the Saudis in Oman and the Horn of Africa to limit communist expansion. US Southwest Asia policy counted on Iran to act as a "regional policeman" and the JCS equipped them handsomely to meet that purpose.⁹⁰ Iran held a significant arsenal and the most sophisticated air force in the region and now could no longer be counted on as a regional opposition to Soviet encroachment. The US was reluctant to send military aid to North Yemen and appeared to stall all measures to supply Sana'a with an ability to counter the NDF and South Yemen. The Saudis now

⁸⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 177.

⁸⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 177.

⁹⁰ Steven Rearden, Kenneth Foulks, and United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint History Office, Issuing Body. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1977-80. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 12. Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015.

viewed themselves as potentially desolate in combatting the Soviet stranglehold on the Arabian Peninsula and its vast oil reserves.⁹¹ The CIA opined that the Saudis were losing faith in US guarantees, nor did the US appreciate the urgency of the Soviet threat encircling the Arabian Peninsula.⁹² Furthermore, the lack of US response to the crisis in Iran deeply worried the Saudis and raised concern that the Soviets viewed this as US weakness and take advantage to increase subversion efforts via the NDF and South Yemenis. They opined that Saudi leadership was “bitterly unhappy” at the lack of an adequate US response to the Shah’s demise. The US was now pressed into a difficult position as their political strength in the Middle East was beginning to unravel.

The Saudi and North Yemeni concerns over Soviet operations in Southern Yemen began to materialize in the late 1970s as an influx of weapons and equipment was observed entering through the port in Aden. A CIA report on Soviet Naval Presence in Aden from April 1978 through April 1979 cited a heightened presence of Soviet Naval activity in South Yemen, to include the mooring of Guided Missile Frigates, Cruise Missile Attack Submarines, Submarine Tenders and other Soviet Naval logistical supply ships.⁹³ Additionally, the report listed the following weapons disembarked and transferred to the South Yemenis at the Port of Aden:

1. FITTER Fighter Bomber Aircraft

⁹¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 181. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d181>

⁹² Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 181.

⁹³ Central Intelligence Agency. “*Soviet Naval Ships and Arms Shipments at Aden South Yemen April 1978-April 1979*”: CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01819A000100610001-7.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2017).

2. ZSU 23/4 Self Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns
3. BTR-60P Armored Personnel Carriers
4. BTR-60PB Armored Personnel Carriers
5. BRDM-2 Amphibious Armored Patrol Vehicle
6. BM-21 Rocket Launchers
7. M-1977 Rocket Launchers
8. Two OSA II Guided Missile Boats
9. Three Polnocny Amphibious Landing Ships
10. One T-58 and one T-43 Fleet Minesweeper
11. One P-6 Fast Attack Boat

It is important to note that the addition of FITTER fighter bombers, self-propelled anti-aircraft platforms, armored personnel carriers and amphibious landing ships gives an adversary state an offensive capability.⁹⁴ The added weapons systems coupled with military advisement from eastern bloc countries could significantly increase the readiness and capabilities of Southern Yemen's military structure. Southern Yemen's military was now better equipped than most of its regional adversaries and was receiving sufficient and effective advisement from communist partners enhancing their perceived threat throughout the region.

The buildup of weapons, advisors, coupled with the development of the NDF within North Yemen added pressure on the US to act in order to cease or reverse the deteriorating situation. A CIA memorandum confirmed that South Yemen was committed

⁹⁴ The report does not specify which variant of FITTER was observed in Aden, but the South Yemeni Air Force was equipped with Su-22 FITTER's, many which were absorbed into the unified Republic of Yemen Air Force. The Su-22 is the export variant of the Soviet Su-7 Fighter bomber.

to undermine the government in Sana'a with the overall objective to unite both Yemen's as one Marxist state.⁹⁵ The memorandum continued to state that South Yemeni Prime Minister Hasani informed a visiting Palestinian delegation that under Saleh's weak hold on power, it was the optimum time for the NDF to strike, for Sana'a to collapse and for the Marxist regime to follow through and solidify power.⁹⁶ Although South Yemen had a smaller population and standing army, it was much better equipped, trained and outfitted for offensive warfare. In addition, with the support of the embedded NDF, any invading South Yemeni Army benefited from friendly indigenous forces.

⁹⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 267. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d267>

⁹⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 267.

Chapter V

Crisis in 1979

A few short weeks after the world rang in the New Year in 1979, a wave of crisis erupted throughout the Middle East. On January 16 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi departed Iran into exile as his pro-western government collapsed and the Iranian Revolution came to an end. On February 14 US Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs was assassinated in Kabul, and unrelated to the murder, the US Embassy in Tehran was overtaken by Iranian protesters who held members of the staff hostage for a brief period. A mere two weeks later, border skirmishes between North and South Yemeni forces erupted into full military conflict. The smaller but better equipped South Yemeni armed forces quickly enveloped North Yemeni forces, disabling armored equipment, routing North Yemeni divisions while inflicting heavy casualties and virtually eliminating the North Yemeni Air Force. The Saudis mobilized their forces but denied requests from Saleh for air support to regain air superiority over North Yemen.⁹⁷ As the South Yemeni divisions marched deeper into North Yemen, it appeared as the Marxists could defeat the much larger North Yemeni Army and the government in Sana'a could collapse. In a matter of weeks, US commitment was tested throughout the Middle East.

It was now the opportune time for the US to act and display its commitment to communist curtailment and the safety and stability of the Arabian Peninsula. Failure to

⁹⁷ Roby Carol Barrett, and Joint Special Operations University, Issuing Body. *Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context*. JSOU Report; 11-3. MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: JSOU Press, 2011.

decisively act and exhibit some form of leadership could validate Saudi fears and unravel US gains within the Middle East. The North Yemeni Air Force had been virtually eliminated and as every day passed, it appeared as if the communist footprint in southern Arabia could grow. Saleh was infuriated that his government was being abandoned of external assistance and the Saudis were positioning themselves to potentially protect the kingdom on their own. On March 1, 1979 the Saudi Foreign Minister informed the US Ambassador and the DoD Attaché that Saudi Arabia was preparing for a military strike to remove South Yemeni Forces from North Yemen if diplomatic efforts to end the conflict failed and emphasized the same message had been relayed to South Yemeni Foreign Minister Muhammed Saleh Muti on February 27, 1979.⁹⁸ The US Embassy Jidda relayed the message to the Department of State detailing the meeting between US officials and the Saudi Foreign Minister and Saudi Director of Intelligence. The Saudis wanted a firm US commitment to support the kingdom and provide the necessary arms and intelligence needed to ensure a successful campaign while reiterating the urgency of the matter.⁹⁹ Absent from the meeting were representative from Saleh's cabinet indicative of how the Saudis and US regarded the government in Sana'a.

As the Yemeni conflict drew into its first week it appeared as if it was about to spread throughout the region. The South's military edge was apparent as Adens forces, equipped with Su-22 fighter bombers, MiG-21 fighters decimated the much larger North

⁹⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 265. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d265>

⁹⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 266. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d266>

Yemeni army. Saudi intelligence warned that Soviet Naval activity had increased in the Bab al-Mandab and US military officers warned that expanding the conflict could potentially place US and Saudi troops in combat with Cuban, East German or Soviet troops.¹⁰⁰ A day after the meeting with the Saudi Foreign Minister, the US Military Training Mission in Dhahran opined via a message to the Department of State, DoD and US Embassy in Saudi Arabia that a political intervention was still favorable if effectively met with US financial support to develop efficient diplomatic, economic and political actions with North Yemen.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, they described Yemen as a test case for US foreign policy; Yemen was impoverished and US foreign policy typically focused on more important initiatives, but the Soviets had made Yemen their battleground for influence, the Saudis were too insecure to counter without US backing, and therefore Yemen was now the “test case for US foreign policy.”¹⁰²

As pressure mounted on the US administration mounted, President Carter’s administration shifted policy direction and acted. On March 7, 1979, President Carter signed Presidential Determination 79-6, Sales of Defense Articles and Defense Services under the Arms Export Control Act to the Yemen Arab Republic. Citing US National Security interests, President Carter certified that an emergency existed where US military

¹⁰⁰ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 266.

¹⁰¹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 269. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d269>

¹⁰² Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 269.

equipment could be sold to Northern Yemen.¹⁰³ The certification called for the US to provide:

1. 12 F-5E Fighter Aircraft
2. 64 M60-A1 Tanks
3. 50 M113-A1 Armored Personnel Carriers
4. Related support, spares, training and munitions for the above systems

For the first time, President Carter utilized the emergency provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, bypassing Congressional approval in order to deliver weapon systems to a state his administration believed was in dire danger of falling under communist rule. Less than a week later the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) directed the deployment of a USAF SR-71 Blackbird surveillance aircraft to the United Kingdom to initiate surveillance overflights over the conflict area in Yemen. Lacking adequate information on extent of South Yemeni advances and the overall status of the conflict, the NSC required additional sources of intelligence to provide a thorough picture of the situation. In an interview with SR-71 historian Paul Crickmore, Col Adelbert “Buzz” Carpenter, the command pilot of the initial surveillance overflight, described the critical nature of the mission and highlighted that the NSC waited anxiously for the intelligence obtained to determine if the Yemeni conflict was about to expand into a broader regional war.¹⁰⁴

In addition to the authorization to supply North Yemen with military equipment and advisors, US military activity within the region increased as well. The US Carrier

¹⁰³ United States. Division of the Federal Register. *The Code of Federal Regulations of the United States of America*, 1980.

¹⁰⁴ Paul Crickmore, *Lockheed Blackbird: Beyond the Secret Missions*. Revised ed. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016.

Strike Group Constellation was re deployed from the Pacific to 200 miles south of Aden and a USAF F-15 Squadron was deployed to Saudi Arabia to defend Saudi airspace and oil fields.¹⁰⁵ This was be the largest deployment of US forces to the region until the Persian Gulf War, and the largest US show of force since the end of the Vietnam. The Director of Central Intelligence was also directed to assess the stability of Saleh's government and identify a potential alternative, friendly to the interests of the US and Saudis.¹⁰⁶

Peace Corps and USAID

Other increases in support followed the military package. The US Peace Corps requested funding increases from \$721,000 in 1978 to \$825,000 in 1979 and \$954,000 in 1980.¹⁰⁷ The Peace Corps supported programs with less visibility, but equally important to sustain relations. Peace Corps projects foster positive interstate relations, exchange of cultural and technical ideas, and work towards addressing issues of poverty, illness and education. Programs such as education, health development, localized engineering and agricultural programs aided in developing good will between the US and North Yemenis

¹⁰⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 271. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d271>. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 188. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d188>. A Carrier Strike Group consists of an Aircraft Carrier, Cruiser, 3 to 4 Destroyers, 65-80 strike aircraft and 7,500 to 8,000 personnel.

¹⁰⁶ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 271.

¹⁰⁷ Peace Corps of the United States. *"Submission to the Congress- Fiscal Year 1980 Budget Estimate, International Programs (Peace Corps)."* [Peacecorps.org](https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/cbj/1980.pdf). <https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/cbj/1980.pdf> (accessed November 28, 2017).

at the local level. Prior to 1979, Peace Corps projects in North Yemen were primarily focused on health and limited only to the three largest cities.¹⁰⁸ The increased funding allowed health projects to add comprehensive vaccinations and by the mid-1980s, the program explored opportunities to venture out from the main urban areas to encompass most of the rural parts of North Yemen.¹⁰⁹

The American Institute for Yemeni Studies (AIYS) published *A Social and Institutional Profile of the Yemen Arab Republic* for the US Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to establish a base from where to focus aid and development programs. The report encompassed an analysis of economic, geographic, and population factors. The authors opined that USAID projects should be limited to areas where relationships between the government and population had been established, and emphasized an urgent need for water resource development as they estimated only 10 percent of the population had access to potable water. They determined lack of North Yemeni government outreach, distrust in the central government and issues of government corruption would hinder many of the outreach programs USAID wanted to undertake.¹¹⁰ The AIYS report was not the first contracted by USAID; in 1976, the Institute for Development Anthropology held the *Workshop on the Problems and Prospects for Development in the Yemen Arab Republic: The Contribution of the Social*

¹⁰⁸ Peace Corps of the United States. "Submission to the Congress- Fiscal Year 1980 Budget Estimate, International Programs (Peace Corps)."

¹⁰⁹ Peace Corps of the United States. "Submission to the Congress- Fiscal Year 1980 Budget Estimate, International Programs (Peace Corps)."

¹¹⁰ Daniel Varisco, Manfred Wenner, and Barbara Pillsbury, Manfred Wenner (ed) *A Social and Institutional Profile of the Yemen Arab Republic*. Prepared for Agency for International Development, Washington DC by AIYS, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, n.d, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAQ893.pdf (accessed on April 23, 2017).

Sciences for USAID. Similar to the AIYS publication, the workshop found several areas where USAID should focus development programs as well as limitations that hinder effective implementation.¹¹¹ The workshop and AIYS publications cited the following similar issues in fostering development programs in North Yemen:

1. Lack of potable water. About 10 percent of the population had potable water.
2. Water supply for agriculture. Over utilized antiquated aquifers and semi-arid environment were straining water supplies for effective agricultural development.
3. Weak central government. Problems with corruption, and limited central control outside of the main Yemeni cities created difficulties in establishing relationships to initiate development programs in rural area where it was most needed.
4. Lack of modern infrastructure. Roads, communications, shipping ports, etc.
5. Remittances. Lucrative wages from Yemeni migrant workers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other regional states created difficulties in establishing long term effective rural development programs. High wages and ease of intra state movement provided incentives which were difficult to outweigh.
6. Qat. While not discussed in this paper, the production of Qat yielded higher economic returns as compared to traditional agricultural food sources.

But even with the increases in funding described at the beginning of this section, along with workshops, publications and studies conducted to determine the most effective and

¹¹¹ Richard N Tutwiler, Muneera Salem-Murdock, and Michael M. Horowitz Workshop on the Problems and Prospects for Development in the Yemen Arab Republic: The Contribution of the Social Sciences, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., October 22, 1976 : A Report. Institute for Development Anthropology (Binghamton, N.Y.). IDA Report; No. 2. Y. Binghamton, N.Y.: Institute for Development Anthropology, 1976. Per the publication, the 1976 workshop was the first meeting of anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, Islamicists, economists and US Government officials to discuss North Yemeni development in a united setting.

necessary programs, USAID and Peace Corps programs were meager compared to those of other nations.¹¹² Dr. Sheila Carapico, Professor of Political Science and International Studies, described US funding for Yemeni development as “pretty paltry” as compared to far greater efforts by China, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to develop roads, schools and hospitals.¹¹³ But nonetheless, as Dr. Carapico states, foreign aid from multiple sources throughout the 1970s and 1980s allowed North Yemen to steadily progress and by 1990 was on the verge of “graduating” from a status of less developed economy into a middle income economy according to the World Bank. As subsequently discussed in this paper, Yemens continued reliance on aid and remittances for growth and stability would lead to its economic collapse shortly after unification.

Saleh and Soviet Weapons Acquisition-1979

Prior to a potential complete collapse of Saleh’s forces, the Arab League intervened and both Yemen’s yielded hostilities and adopted the Kuwaiti Agreement of 1979 which called for the unification of both states and development of an agreed constitution. As the US rushed to provide a military aid package under the auspices of protecting North Yemen from imminent collapse at the hands of an invasion from South Yemen, Saleh’s government signed a quiet deal with the Soviets accepting a significant

¹¹² Sheila Carapico, "No Quick Fix : Foreign Aid and State Performance in Yemen." *Rebuilding Devastated Economies in the Middle East*, 153-76. 2007.

¹¹³ Carapico, "*No Quick Fix : Foreign Aid and State Performance in Yemen*," 185.

amount of sophisticated weapons.¹¹⁴ Saleh needed weapons and he was willing to purchase them from whichever nation was willing to make an arrangement.

The US package did not arrive in time, but the crisis and decision by Carter to present military force provided Saleh with an understanding that the US was willing to intervene to counter an existential threat. In an interview with Ambassador George Lane who served in North Yemen from 1978-1981, he stated that the military package was of vital interest to US policy in the region and even if the Yemenis had no idea how to operate the US equipment, the mere “psychological” effect was enough to calm the tension in the region.¹¹⁵ Additionally he opined that the crisis leading up to Carter’s decision had deeply troubled the Saudis and that “even if the crisis in Yemen had not existed, we would have to invent it in order to show the Soviet’s that we hadn’t been completely demoralized by Vietnam and we were still prepared to protect our interests by sending military forces if we had to.”¹¹⁶ Unfortunately the interests the US wanted to protect lay in Saudi oil fields and waterways of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, not Sana’a.

The US was displeased with the Soviet military aid package and concerned that Saleh’s government was shifting towards the left, and that potential unification of the Yemen’s could favor NDF or South Yemeni terms.¹¹⁷ During a meeting between US

¹¹⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 293. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d293>

¹¹⁵ George Lane, US Ambassador to Yemen 1978-1981, interviewed by Richard Nethercut, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, August 27, 1990.

¹¹⁶ George Lane, US Ambassador to Yemen 1978-1981, interviewed by Richard Nethercut.

¹¹⁷ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 293.

Under Secretary of State David Newsom, North Yemen's Ambassador to the UN Mushin al-Ayni and North Yemen's Ambassador to the US Mutawakel, al-Ayni delivered the following message from Saleh: "if the US felt Yemen deserves help and was seriously interested in providing this, Saleh was prepared to go ahead with cooperation with the US."¹¹⁸ Under Secretary Newman followed by reiterating the US had an established ongoing economic assistance program, had delivered on its promise of military assistance and training but cautioned the US was concerned with the direction Saleh's government had taken.¹¹⁹ Saleh was developing a delicate political strategy in order to acquire the necessary money and equipment to solidify power. Saleh also understood the pressure the US could exert on Saudi Arabia which in turn could strengthen Saleh's political position in the region. He also wanted increased direct relations with the US, with less Saudi interference, which strengthened him politically at home and strengthen his ability to bargain for critical aid.

Sana'a's relationship with the Soviet Union was complex and highlighted how different the North/South Yemen struggles were from the traditional ideological struggles of Germany, Korea and Vietnam during the Cold War. Unlike the traditional Cold War conflicts, the Soviet Union maintained relations and sold weapons to governments in both North and South Yemen. During the conflict in 1979, a desperate Saleh approached the Soviets for arms when promises from the US and Saudis lagged. The Soviets provided a

¹¹⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 293. In the telegram, Saleh is written as Saleh, but is referring to President Ali Abdullah Saleh.

¹¹⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 293.

generous package of Su-22 fighter bombers, MiG-21 fighters, tanks, munitions and small arms. Mark Katz wrote that the Soviet Union pursued two contradictory policies in the Third World. The Soviets pursued policies of promoting revolutions while also establishing good relations with conservative states, and in North Yemen they pursued both.¹²⁰ Furthermore, he described Sana'a's relationship as a delicate balance where Saleh pursued quicker and cheaper weapons packages from the Soviets while pushing back at efforts to broaden diplomatic ties and "sacrifice any of its independence in return." Saleh understood the US and Saudi Arabia could not cut off his government wholly as doing so could potentially push them further into the Soviet sphere, while the Soviets understood that supplying the North with weapons allowed for a continuous relationship which could further its efforts to destabilize the Saudi Arabia. By dealing directly with the Soviets, Saleh was able to circumvent Saudi intervention and oversight in the weapons North Yemen could receive. Saleh's astute policies allowed him to benefit from both the US and the Soviets as they both graciously filled his stockpiles of weapons in their respective quests for influence.

As the 1970s progressed military weapon imports to North Yemen grew exponentially. From about 5 million dollars' worth of arms to a height of 800 million worth in 1981, the government in Sana'a was increasing its stockpiles to further stabilize its own government while developing the defense needed to confront the ever growing and modernizing South Yemeni military.¹²¹ But by early 1980, the US and Saudis were

¹²⁰ Mark Katz, "Sanaa and the Soviets." *Problems of Communism* vol. 33, no. 1 (1984): 21-34.

¹²¹ U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1972-1982*. Available at <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185658.pdf> (accessed on September 28, 2017).

becoming unnerved with the political situation in North Yemen. President Saleh's government ties to the Soviet Union were growing upsetting the tri lateral relationship. In February 1980 National Security Advisor Brzezinski briefed President Carter on a meeting with Crown Prince Fahd and what the Saudis described as a "very dangerous and frightening situation" emanating from Southern Yemen.¹²² The Saudi government provided Brzezinski intelligence reports that detailed the following Soviet activity:¹²³

1. Movement of 10,000 Soviet troops into Southern Yemen for a supposed exercise
2. Potential Soviet activity in 5th province near the Saudi Arabian border
3. Enhanced Soviet Naval activity in Yemeni territorial waters (does not specify if North or South Yemeni waters)
4. Movement of 3,000 Cuban troops into Aden
5. Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operating from Aden and patrolling the region
6. Soviet weapons arriving at Muntaza Nashwan in Southern Yemen via ships, at night, which included rocket carriers, guns and transport trucks

The Saudis also shared the US concern regarding President Saleh's interactions and proposals to integrate the NDF into his government.¹²⁴ The political alliance did not occur, and Saleh relented to Saudi pressure to ease off dependence and alliance with the Soviet Union. But the mere attempt frightened the Saudis who still had not developed a

¹²² Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 207. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d207>

¹²³ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 207.

¹²⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 207.

viable strategy on political relations with Saleh. Saleh wasn't interested in Soviet programs other than weapons and infrastructure development, and as Katz opined in *Sana'a and the Soviets*, the attempt to incorporate the NDF into the government was more as a condition for the withdrawal of South Yemeni forces from North Yemen in 1979.¹²⁵ Saleh effectively maneuvered a delicate political landscape by exploiting Saudi insecurities about his government and North Yemeni stability.

Further complicating the security situation, on January 3, 1980, the CIA issued a Security Warning that the Soviet Union was planning on outfitting Southern Yemen's military with SCUD-B ballistic missiles.¹²⁶ The SCUD-B is a Short Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) developed in the early 1960's by the Soviet Union capable of deploying nuclear, chemical or high explosive warheads at an effective range of 300km.¹²⁷ The addition of the SCUD-B to South Yemen's arsenal turned a small impoverished state into a ballistic capable foe, who now had greater reach over most of the southern Arabian peninsula, Oman, the Horn of Africa and vital shipping lanes. At the time, Saudi Arabia maintained no effective defense against a ballistic threat.

In addition to military aid and development program aid, North Yemen also received substantial support in developing intelligence and special security services. In

¹²⁵ Katz, *"Sanaa and the Soviets,"* 25.

¹²⁶ Central Intelligence Agency. *"Reports of Soviet Plans to Provide North Yemen with Ground-to-Ground Missile. Possibly SCUD B."* CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83b01027r000300170041-5> (accessed January 2, 2018). According to the Strategic Warning, an additional CIA report cites that the Soviet Union directed the North Yemeni Military that the SCUD-B weapon systems were intended to be used against Saudi Arabia, not North Yemen. The additional report cited had not been de classified and approved for public release by the time this thesis was drafted, therefore no additional information is available.

¹²⁷ Center for Strategic and International Studies. *"Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense Project: SS-1 (SCUD A/B/C/D)."* <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/scud/> (accessed January 2, 2018).

1981, the CIA implemented a reorganization of Sana'a's intelligence service pursuant to the authorization contained in the March 27, 1980 Presidential Finding on the Yemen Arab Republic.¹²⁸ The CIA was not overly thrilled as they questioned Saleh's true commitment to a partnership with the US, but cited that the Soviet Union had also offered assistance, Saleh preferred US assistance, and CIA training helped develop a means to defeat the threat posed by the NDF and influence pro US policies and politicians within Sana'a's government.¹²⁹ CIA training also provided a highly trained and skilled security apparatus, capable of weeding out potential dissidents, and providing detailed information on who could cause instability or threaten Saleh's power. The CIA, the organization tasked with collecting intelligence on behalf of the US government, was now tasked to develop an organization whose mandate was to root out internal dissension.

In August 1981, a Cooperation Treaty was signed by Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen. The treaty aimed to develop a mutual defense and financial aid pact in order to defeat US influence in the region. The Soviets were not directly associated to the pact, but it met their goals of regional, anti-West pacts. The CIA assessed that the pact threatened regional US partners, and felt the move was positive for the US as it could increase demand for aid and support.¹³⁰ The treaty was weak, Libya was not an effective

¹²⁸ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 267. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d267>

¹²⁹ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 267.

¹³⁰ Central Intelligence Agency. *"The Libyan-Ethiopian-South Yemeni Pact: Short Term Prospects."* CIA.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200010-5.pdf> (accessed November 27, 2017).

partner for any form of aid and although the three states shared a common enemy, the US, they lacked any other commonality. The US understood the weakness but also knew it could capitalize its position through funding to strengthen its partnerships.

In 1983 the US Air Force requisitioned a research study titled *Enhancing US Leverage in Persian Gulf/Middle East Conflicts* from the RAND Corporation. The chaotic events of the late 1970s and early 1980s demanded a thorough analysis of military preparedness interests in the Middle East. Within a matter of months, the DoD deployed a significant amount of combat warships and aircraft to the region amidst an increased deterioration of security. Politically, the US maintained weak relations with all but a few Arab states and chose a policy to support a handful of strategically important states while relegating others as second tier states. The RAND study recognized the inherent weakness on North Yemen's government and opined that strengthened ties with the US couple improve Sana'a's credibility and subsequently strengthen its position against the NDF.¹³¹ Leftist insurgency risks outside of South Yemen had diminished after the end of Abdul Fatah Ismail's rule in 1980 but the Soviets maintained unfettered access to Aden's ports and airfields.¹³² The study concluded that ties between the Soviet Union and South Yemen were unlikely to weaken and therefore the US should continue enhancing policies which fortify the security of North Yemen, and coincidentally suggested re opening diplomatic relations with Southern Yemen.¹³³ But the US continued

¹³¹ Laurie Mylroie and Rand Corporation. *Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges*. A Rand Note; N-2052-AF. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1983.

¹³² Laurie Mylroie and Rand Corporation. *Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges*.

its stagnant policy towards Yemen leaving Southern Yemen with no alternative other than the Soviets and North Yemen weak and beholden to others financial solvency.

The race to supply both Yemeni states with weapons packages continued throughout the 1980s. As Katz discussed, Saleh obtained from both the US and the Soviet Union, while the government in Aden obtained weapons primarily from the Soviets, with a small percentage coming from other Soviet aligned states.¹³⁴

- From 1979 to 1983 the Soviet Union supplied South Yemen with \$1.5 billion dollars' worth of weapons and North Yemen with \$1.2 billion; during the same period the US provided North Yemen with \$200 million worth of military equipment.¹³⁵
- From 1982 to 1986 the Soviet Union supplied South Yemen with \$1.9 billion dollars' worth of weapons and North Yemen with \$1.3 billion; during the same period the US provided North Yemen with \$50 million worth of military equipment.¹³⁶
- From 1987 to 1991 the Soviet Union supplied South Yemen with \$1.4 billion dollars' worth of weapons and North Yemen with \$1.5 billion; during the same period the US provided North Yemen with \$20 million worth of military equipment.¹³⁷

¹³³ Laurie Mylroie and Rand Corporation. *Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges*.

¹³⁴ Katz "Sanaa and the Soviets" 21-34.

¹³⁵ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1979-1983. <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/> (accessed on September 28, 2017).

¹³⁶ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1988. <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/> (accessed on September 28, 2017).

- From 1992 to 1994, both the US and Russia provided the newly unified Republic of Yemen nothing in military aid packages.¹³⁸

Two figures are striking from the period of military equipment packages provided to the Yemeni states. First, Soviet military packages to South Yemen were always greater than those to North Yemen up until the 1986 South Yemeni Civil War. After 1986 through unification, the Soviets provided almost equal amounts to both Yemen's. Mark Katz opined in *Sanaa and the Soviets* that although the Soviets sold to both Yemen's, they always provided greater, better and more advanced to their preferred satellite in Aden.¹³⁹ Second, US packages to North Yemen dropped significantly after the 1986 South Yemeni Civil War. The South Yemeni Civil War significantly weakened the South and new border demilitarization agreements that came between Sana'a and Aden lowered the possibility of another conflict between the states.

¹³⁷ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1991-1992. <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/> (accessed on September 28, 2017).

¹³⁸ US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1995. <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/> (accessed on September 28, 2017).

¹³⁹ Katz, "*Sanaa and the Soviets*," 21-34.

Chapter VI

Unification

An important matter to understand in the greater study of Yemen and the Cold War is the unification of both states in 1990. As Stephen Day explains, the division of South and North Yemen was dissimilar to the division of Germany or Korea where Cold War politics developed the internal national divides.¹⁴⁰ A unified Yemen did not exist prior the Cold War and not until after the Soviets and US became involved in Yemeni affairs did serious consideration towards unification begin. Unification talks extended over decades and were marred by the rivalries and conflicts that occurred during the Cold War. Dr. Carapico described the unified state as a “teenager, born only in 1990 of the marriage of two weak unstable governments in their twenties.”¹⁴¹ Her amusing analogy is an accurate description for the new nation formed from two dissimilar political ideologies plagued by decades of conflict and mistrust.

US Intelligence agencies made mention of unification of the Yemeni states as early as 1967. In December 1967, the CIA assessed that a Republican win in North Yemen could lead to collaboration between the states and eventual unification.¹⁴² The Cairo Agreement of 1972, Tripoli Accord of 1972 and Kuwaiti Agreement of 1979 all

¹⁴⁰ Stephen W. Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union. Cambridge Middle East Studies*; 37. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

¹⁴¹ Carapico. "No Quick Fix : Foreign Aid and State Performance in Yemen." 183.

¹⁴² Central Intelligence Agency. "The Situation in Yemen and South Yemen and the Soviet Role." CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A003000400001-8.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2017)

called for the unification of both Yemen's and the 1981 Draft Constitution for a United Yemen laid out the framework and diplomatic conversations which led to unification. It took a considerable amount of time due to tribal and economic differences, but they both saw themselves as part of one Yemeni nation.¹⁴³ But by 1983, US military analysts opined that North Yemen did not desire unification, and talks between the Yemeni states were merely a means to continue dialogue on improving relations.¹⁴⁴ The repeated interstate conflicts, tribal disagreements, corruption and extreme poverty provided a grim outlook to the potential for a unified conflict free single Yemeni state. On January 19, 1990 the CIA Directorate of Intelligence published a report where they were suspect that unification could occur.¹⁴⁵ The analysis agreed that great strides towards unifying had been made, and due to the dire economic situation both Yemen's faced it could benefit them both, they cited long lasting mutual distrust, political and tribal differences as roadblocks to an effective unification.¹⁴⁶ But the collapse of the Soviet Union expedited the decade's long negotiations towards unification.

¹⁴³ Central Intelligence Agency. *"The Situation in Yemen and South Yemen and the Soviet Role."*

¹⁴⁴ Laurie Mylroie and Rand Corporation. *Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges*. A Rand Note; N-2052-AF. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1983.

¹⁴⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. *"North and South Yemen: In Search of Unity"* CIA.gov. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000244584.pdf (accessed December 15, 2017). The CIA Directorate of Intelligence was renamed as the Directorate of Analysis in 2015. The mission of the Directorate of Analysis according to the CIA mission statement, accessed from <https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-analysis/history.html> on January 16, 2018 is: Directorate of Analysis (DA), where incomplete and sometimes contradictory information is transformed into unique insights that inform US policy decisions. The DA helps provide timely, accurate, and objective all-source intelligence analysis on national security and foreign policy issues to senior policymakers in the US government.

¹⁴⁶ Central Intelligence Agency. *"North and South Yemen: In Search of Unity."*

The Soviet Union's demise presented the South Yemenis a dire economic situation. Economic aid to Adens government came to a complete halt presenting a potential financial collapse. The leading Marxist power had collapsed further weakening its appeal in the developing world. Both Yemen's were plagued with poverty and weak economies, but due to South Yemen's allegiance to the Soviet sphere, it lacked strong effective trade and financial ties with other regional states. Unification would be more equitable for both Yemen's and a critical life line for South Yemen who was soon to become financially insolvent. South Yemen had been backed by the Soviets and lacking that financial security unification was the only solution to avoid a complete economic collapse. The 1986 conflict in Southern Yemen further deteriorated Adens resources. By 1988, oil fields discovered in Southern Yemen were being developed by the Soviets, but according to a CIA paper, the government in Aden was becoming frustrated at the slow progression of work to extract oil and were discussing the potential to have western firms come in and develop the fields.¹⁴⁷ But the CIA felt the ties to Moscow were too strong, economic reliance on the Soviets was too great, and the differences between Socialist Yemeni leaders and North Yemeni leaders were too significant to mend relations. The CIA did not anticipate the effect economic assistance had on South Yemen nor did they have an accurate assessment of the political differences and their effect on dialogue between both Yemen's. A short four months passed from the publication of the CIA Directorate of Intelligence Report and the Yemen's unified, catching US diplomats at the Department of State by surprise.

¹⁴⁷ Central Intelligence Agency. *"South Yemen's Oil Resources: The Chimera of Wealth."* CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp89s01450r000500500001-7> (accessed January 2, 2018).

The unification process established Yemen as a pioneer amongst Arab states in its quest for self-determination and formation of a democratic republic. Ambassador Bodine opined that due to the decade's long negotiations the unification was fairer and more balanced than the highly celebrated German unification.¹⁴⁸ Under the 1972 Cairo Agreement, the leaders of North and South Yemen agreed that a unified Yemen would be established as a democratic state, with a republican form of government and would establish free elections and "broad political rights."¹⁴⁹ It was not without difficulties as there were disagreements, failures on behalf of representative assemblies to ratify proposals, and significant political differences between both states, but the foundation had been set forward. The landscape of the unified Yemen was littered with sophisticated weapons decades after the conclusion of the Cold War. Aircraft, munitions, tanks and hardware provided by the Cold War foes to their respective allies were used in multiple conflicts up through the Yemeni Crisis of 2015. Oddly enough, SCUD missiles similar to those first obtained by the South Yemenis in the early 1980s, which the Soviets originally intended to be used against the Saudis, have reigned down in terror over southern portions of the kingdom from 2015 through 2018.¹⁵⁰ Weapons that were costly to maintain and unnecessary for a state the size of Yemen, embattled by poverty and lacking the conventional threat which would deem them necessary.

¹⁴⁸ Barbara K. Bodine, US Ambassador to Yemen 1997-2001, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 14, 2017.

¹⁴⁹ Central Intelligence Agency. "*North and South Yemen: In Search of Unity*" CIA.gov. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000244584.pdf (accessed December 15, 2017).

¹⁵⁰ Central Intelligence Agency. "*Reports of Soviet Plans to Provide North Yemen with Ground-to-Ground Missile. Possibly SCUD B.*" CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83b01027r000300170041-5> (accessed January 2, 2018).

Chapter VII

The End of the Cold War

The last remaining years of the Cold War were a period of significant change, upheaval and uncertainty. A myriad of new nations were formed or regained independence, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, President George HW Bush entered office in the US and the two Yemen were unified creating the Republic of Yemen. Within the Middle East, the Iraqi regime invaded Kuwait and quickly envelope the attention of the world. The invasion prompted the US to act quickly as the Iraqi invasion could threaten Saudi security and its oil reserves. Iraq's aggression sparked the largest mobilization of US air and ground forces since the Vietnam War and created the largest coalition of nations contributing military forces since WWII.¹⁵¹ The US took the case of Iraqi aggression to the UN and seek worldwide approval to condemn the aggression and call for immediate withdrawal, even if it was necessitated by military force. Yemen, who existed as a unified state for barely 6 months, exerted a political dagger to the US from its seat at the UN Security Council and ignited the retribution of an angered US administration.¹⁵² In 1990, US diplomats at the United Nation's warned the newly unified Republic of Yemen that a "No" vote against military intervention in Iraq would be the

¹⁵¹ Col Ronald P. Dale, *Mobilization for Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Lessons Learned*, Research Report no. AD-A251-205 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, April 1992), 12.

¹⁵² Yemen occupied a non-permanent member seat at the UN from 1990-1991.

most expensive vote ever cast by the Yemeni Ambassador to the UN.¹⁵³ Ultimately, Iraq was expelled from Kuwait in the largest ground invasion and airpower campaign seen since WWII, but in the tense months leading to the conflict, US diplomats feverishly attempted to entice the Yemeni government to their favor.

By the time of unification, Yemen had received a substantial amount of aid and was able to equip a fairly modern army and air force with US assistance. Prior to unification, Yemen was not a country of high interest. Ambassador Dunbar stated that “no one really paid attention until the Yemen’s began to unite.”¹⁵⁴ He went on to state that upon unification, the Department of State messaged him that no one had seen “this coming” and that they were completely unaware of the impending unification. The Ambassador had been updating the Department of State of the progression towards unification for months prior via diplomatic cables highlighting the amount of attention placed on Yemen by the US government. Even with the discovery of oil, Yemen was still highly dependent on foreign development assistance of which about \$70 million came from the US. The invasion of Kuwait again made Yemen significant to US policy makers. General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander, US Central Command visited Yemen in 1990 with an interest to garner support in order to stage military forces as the coalition against Iraq formed. General Schwarzkopf favored Yemeni bases and ports to other sites throughout the region and asked Ambassador Dunbar if he believed the US

¹⁵³ Dunbar, US Ambassador to Yemen 1988-1991, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 9, 2017.

¹⁵⁴ Dunbar, US Ambassador to Yemen 1988-1991, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 9, 2017.

could stage and station troops in Yemen.¹⁵⁵ The General never brought up the question again, at least Ambassador Dunbar never heard more and the question was never staffed by the US military. Ambassador Dunbar felt that President Saleh would have enthusiastically accepted such a proposition; it could have helped him solidify power and expand his influence outside of Yemen. Yemen presented a valuable strategic position for the US. The US valued many of the same key interests as the Soviets did a decade earlier; a deep water natural port, mountainous terrain, and airfields that can reach all of the Arabian Peninsula, North and East Africa, the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.

But Yemen remained steadfast and on Thanksgiving Day, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker traveled to Sana'a and met with President Ali Abdullah Saleh in an effort to persuade a "yes" vote for a resolution of use of force on Iraq. Ambassador Dunbar described President Saleh as shrewd and wanted to push his weight; Yemen voted no at the UN and politically, "resolution 678 crashed."¹⁵⁶ After Yemen's vote in front of the UN, Secretary Baker wrote an aide "Yemen's permanent representative just enjoyed about \$200 to \$250 million worth of applause for that speech."¹⁵⁷ The US followed through on its threat and cut off development funding to Yemen, including additional funding from the World Bank and the IMF. As the only standing superpower

¹⁵⁵ Dunbar, US Ambassador to Yemen 1988-1991, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 9, 2017.

¹⁵⁶ Dunbar, US Ambassador to Yemen 1988-1991, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 9, 2017.

¹⁵⁷ James Addison Baker and Thomas M. Defrank, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989- 1992*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995.

at the end of the Cold War, the US could carry out its threat without concern of another world power filling the void.

Looking back at the decision, it seems difficult to understand how Saleh could make such a rash political decision especially one that spurred grave economic consequences from the US and Saudis. But as previously described, he was a shrewd leader who wanted to break free of Saudi dependence and forge his own power, equal amongst regional states. In 1989 Iraq, North Yemen, Egypt and Jordan formed the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), a counter to the Saudi led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The ACC started with summits on economic cooperation, free movement of labor flows by abolishing visa requirements, and development of a common marketplace; all issues of economic development important to Saleh, as well as giving him an equal voice amongst other state leaders of the council.¹⁵⁸ North Yemen sent a brigade of soldiers to fight the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War and after the end of the conflict, Iraq provided Sana'a military advisors and captured Iranian equipment.¹⁵⁹ Iraq's support did not end Saleh's dependence on the Saudis or the US but it was a step towards broadened interstate relations especially with powers who were at odds with the Saudis. Furthermore, the CIA assessed that Saleh sought a counterweight to Saudi influence and an alternative to the GCC after being rejected from membership twice. Saleh took a dangerous gamble and as Ambassador Dunbar commented, Saleh was pushing past his

¹⁵⁸ Curtis Ryan. "Jordan and the Rise and Fall of the Arab Cooperation Council." *Middle East Journal* 52 (1998): 386-390.

¹⁵⁹ Central Intelligence Agency. "The Arab Cooperation Council: A Shaky Strategic Consensus." CIA.gov. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000205721.pdf (accessed on February 5, 2018).

own weight.¹⁶⁰ The Cold War was over and the threat of a leftist regime at Saudi Arabia's southern flank was gone. Saleh could no longer pit the US and Soviets against each other in a quest for dominance and the Saudis and US could effectively cut Yemen off without fear that Saleh could run elsewhere for the weapons and aid his government desperately needed.

Stephen Day Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Stetson University opined that Saddam Hussein urged and possibly funded Saleh's efforts to unify the Yemen's as a united Yemen could threaten Saudi Arabia's southern border.¹⁶¹ In interviews Day conducted for his book *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union* he states that many claimed that Iraq was "bankrolling" Saleh's efforts to unify the country.¹⁶² The Iraqi's and North Yemen forged a strong alliance in the 1980s and while Southern Yemen was on the brink of financial disaster as the Soviet Union collapsed, Saleh now had leverage over the YSP and a new partner to counter the reliance on the Saudis.¹⁶³ An October 1990 interview of Saleh by Judith Miller of the New York Times provided additional insight into his rationale for supporting Hussein. Miller described Saleh as bitter towards the Saudis and wrote that Saleh had "strong comments" about the Saudis, describing the kingdom as "undemocratic" and further accusing the Saudis were attempting to destabilize the unification by bribing South

¹⁶⁰ Dunbar, US Ambassador to Yemen 1988-1991, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 9, 2017.

¹⁶¹ Stephen W. Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge Middle East Studies ; 37. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

¹⁶² Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*.

¹⁶³ Day, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*.

Yemeni officials.¹⁶⁴ Saleh continued by stating that the Saudis had always fermented dissent when there was a dispute between them and they feared a unified and democratic Yemen.¹⁶⁵ In Hussein, Saleh found an Arab Nationalist who could bring about a new regional alliance, free of Saudi and GCC dominance. But Saleh's gamble was rash and unwise and he faced the unpleasant wraith of an angered Saudi and US government.

The Saudi government expelled close to one million Yemeni workers from the kingdom dealing a crucial hit to Yemen's GDP. A World Bank study of North Yemen's economy in 1979 estimated that about 30 percent of the male labor force were employed as laborers in oil producing nations throughout the region.¹⁶⁶ In 1990, remittances from Yemeni workers throughout the world accounted for 26.53 percent of Yemen's GDP. As Figure 7 shows, by 1991, the percentage dropped to 16.834 percent and by 1992 it fell further to 15.753 percent. But as Ambassador Bodine stated, the belief that the expulsion was tied to Yemen's support for Iraq at the UN was historically inaccurate; the Saudis had begun sending Yemeni workers back home prior to the conflict due to a reduction in need for foreign laborers.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless the Yemeni workers who were primarily unskilled laborers would find limited employment opportunities once they returned home.

¹⁶⁴ Judith Miller, "*Mideast Tensions; Yemen's Chief Assails Saudis on Gulf Crisis.*" New York Times (New York, NY), October 26, 1990.

¹⁶⁵ Miller, "*Mideast Tensions; Yemen's Chief Assails Saudis on Gulf Crisis.*"

¹⁶⁶ World Bank. 1979. *Yemen Arab Republic - Development of a traditional economy* (English). A World Bank country study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/818431468781149336/Yemen-Arab-Republic-Development-of-a-traditional-economy>

¹⁶⁷ Bodine, US Ambassador to Yemen 1997-2001, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 14, 2017.




Figure 7. Personal remittances, received (% of GDP), Republic of Yemen, 1990-1993, World Bank staff estimates based on IMF balance of payments data, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates.

<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?end=1993&locations=YE&start=1990>

Kuwaiti aid, which was second to Saudi amongst Arab states, ceased once the Kuwaiti's regained sovereignty after Iraq's expulsion in 1991. Yemen would not see substantial aid from either Arab state for almost a decade, crippling Saleh's ability to pay a disproportionality large civil service, military and government programs. From 1990 through the end of the decade, Yemen's annual population growth averaged at about 3.4 percent, far surpassing the 0.7 percent average annual growth of developed nations.¹⁶⁸ As

¹⁶⁸ United States Agency for International Development, "Yemen Gap Analysis: Strategic Planning and Analysis Division," www.usaid.gov,

unemployment grew, remittances fell and anger grew as Saleh's fragile young unified government faced a growing uncertainty.

Saleh's gamble to support Iraq also affected simpler aid programs which rarely grab significant analyses, but nonetheless create potential crisis for a state in need. US Peace Corps and USAID development aid to Yemen was drastically cut. All programs were suspended, all Peace Corps volunteers were withdrawn and funding was decreased from \$1,141,000 in 1990 to an estimated \$288,000 in 1991. In its 1992 report to Congress, the Peace Corps cited concerns that the cessation of support programs would cripple development in healthcare, education, scientific and technical programs at a time when most needed for the newly unified country. Yemen was not the only country to lose Peace Corps support and funding, nor did the Congressional report state that it was due to its lack of support for US policy regarding Iraq, but the loss coupled with other development support would further cripple the new state.¹⁶⁹

There was some confidence that the newly unified Republic could become economically independent from foreign sources and therefore survive and thrive. Mark Katz opined in his 1992 paper *Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security* that newly found oil reserves in Yemen could help sway from foreign dependence and provide a means to fund their own weapon acquisition programs.¹⁷⁰ He perceived that a renewed sense of Yemeni Nationalism from unification pride, simmering long lasting tensions with Saudi

<https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/Yemen%202011.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2018).

¹⁶⁹ Peace Corps of the United States. "Congressional Presentation- FY 1992." [Peacecorps.org](https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/cbj/1992.pdf). <https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/cbj/1992.pdf> (accessed November 28, 2017).

¹⁷⁰ Mark Katz, "Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security." *Middle East Policy* 1, no. 1 (1992): 117-35.

Arabia and potential for increased economic autonomy would lead to a stronger politically unified state who could potentially foster the strength to effectively chart its own destiny.¹⁷¹ Coincidentally, within the paper the author does describe how the deteriorating relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia could one day lead to Iranian military support for Yemen in an effort to destabilize the Kingdom.¹⁷² But the author did not take into account the significant reliance on remittances, the fluctuation of oil prices and demand, as well as the unsettled tensions which remained from four decades of cross border conflict which could destabilize the young unified state.

Further crippling Saleh's fragile grip on the new unified state was a loss of revenue from oil production. Yemen did not produce large quantities of oil compared to other regional states, but it produced enough to become Saleh's principle export and means to pay for a bloated public sector. According to USAID, hydrocarbons accounted for 30 percent of Yemeni GDP and 75 percent of overall government revenues in the 1990s.¹⁷³ The oil sector could have been a potential avenue to employ the returning unemployed Yemenis but as Figure 8 shows, oil production tapered off at about 200 thousand barrels per day in 1990 and dropped through 1992. Oil prices spiked in 1990 due to the Gulf War, but the high prices lasted less than a year and dropped again through 1992. After 1992 oil production and exports increased dramatically, reaching heights

¹⁷¹ Katz, "*Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security*" 117-35.

¹⁷² Katz, "*Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security*" 117-35.

¹⁷³ United States Agency for International Development, "*Yemen Gap Analysis: Strategic Planning and Analysis Division*," [www.usaid.gov,https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/Yemen%202011.pdf](https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/Yemen%202011.pdf) (accessed January 3, 2018).

close to 450 thousand barrels per day but the loss of revenue coupled with significant losses in remittances and foreign aid set Yemen on a downward economic spiral. Lack of employment, a crippled economy, and a fractured government led the young republic into disarray and conflict.




Figure 8. Yemen Crude Production, Exports, Consumption.
<http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm>

A decade after the end of the Cold War, Yemen again captured the attention of the US when the warship USS Cole was bombed while refueling in the Port of Aden. In the decade leading to the bombing, Yemen remained in the peripheral of US Mideast policy. Relations between the US and Yemen remained sour until around 1997. During

testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Anthony Zinni, Commander of US Central Command cited that relations began to improve after the arrival of Ambassador Bodine in 1997.¹⁷⁴ He credited the Ambassador's vision to "build on success and avoid rushing" and her support of military to military partnerships while citing the strategic importance of the Port of Aden for the US Navy.¹⁷⁵ Similarly, Ambassador Bodine credited General Zinni for his efforts to change the focus of DoD and policy makers by making efforts in countries such as Yemen.¹⁷⁶ Summing up his testimony regarding the background of Yemen and years leading up the attack on the USS Cole, General Zinni would say "Now, why Yemen, from America's point of view?"¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁴ United States, Congress. *The Attack on the U.S.S. Cole*: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, October 19 and 25, 2000. U.S. G.P.O. Congressional Sales Office, 2002.

¹⁷⁵ United States, Congress. *The Attack on the U.S.S. Cole*.

¹⁷⁶ Bodine, US Ambassador to Yemen 1997-2001, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 14, 2017.

¹⁷⁷ United States, Congress. *The Attack on the U.S.S. Cole*: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, October 19 and 25, 2000. U.S. G.P.O. Congressional Sales Office, 2002.

References

"A Report to the National Security Council - NSC 68", 12 April 1950.

Baker, James Addison, and DeFrank, Thomas M. *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989- 1992*. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995.

Barrett, Roby Carol, and Joint Special Operations University, Issuing Body. *Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context*. JSOU Report; 11-3. MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: JSOU Press, 2011.

Bodine, Barbara K., US Ambassador to Yemen 1997-2001, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 14, 2017.

Burrowes, Robert D. *The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962-1986*. Westview Special Studies on the Middle East. Boulder: London: Westview Press; Croom Helm, 1987.

——— "Yemen Arab Republic." London: Taylor and Francis, 2004: 2391- 395.

Carapico, Sheila. "No Quick Fix : Foreign Aid and State Performance in Yemen." *Rebuilding Devastated Economies in the Middle East*, 153-76. 2007.

Carter, Jimmy. "Foreign Assistance Programs Message to the Congress," March 17, 1977. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7188>.

Carter, Jimmy. "The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress," January 23, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=33079> (accessed October 10, 2017).

Crickmore, Paul, *Lockheed Blackbird: Beyond the Secret Missions*, Revised ed. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2016.

Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Missile Threat, CSIS Missile Defense Project: SS-1 (SCUD A/B/C/D)." <https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/scud/> (accessed January 2, 2018).

Central Intelligence Agency. "*Communist Intervention Comparison*." CIA.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp81b00401r000200020004-7> (accessed July 15, 2017).

Central Intelligence Agency. “*The Libyan-Ethiopian-South Yemeni Pact: Short Term Prospects.*” CIA.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200010-5.pdf> (accessed November 27, 2017).

Central Intelligence Agency. “*North and South Yemen: Comparative Military Capabilities.*” CIA.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP88T00096R000800980002-6.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2017).

Central Intelligence Agency. “*North and South Yemen: In Search of Unity*” CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000244584.pdf (accessed December 15, 2017).

Central Intelligence Agency. “*Reports of Soviet Plans to Provide North Yemen with Ground-to-Ground Missile. Possibly SCUD B.*” CIA.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83b01027r000300170041-5> (accessed January 2, 2018).

Central Intelligence Agency. “*South Yemen’s Oil Resources: The Chimera of Wealth.*” CIA.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp89s01450r000500500001-7> (accessed January 2, 2018).

Central Intelligence Agency. “*Soviet Amphibious Forces: Tasks and Capabilities in General War and Peace.*” Cia.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1979-06-01.pdf> (accessed July 15, 2017)

Central Intelligence Agency. “*The Arab Cooperation Council: A Shaky Strategic Consensus.*” CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000205721.pdf (accessed on February 5, 2018).

Central Intelligence Agency. “*The Situation in Yemen and South Yemen and the Soviet Role.*” CIA.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00826A003000400001-8.pdf> (accessed October 10, 2017)

Central Intelligence Agency. “*South Yemen- USSR: Outlook for the Relationship.*” CIA.gov, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000681975.pdf (accessed on July 20, 2017).

Central Intelligence Agency. “*The Soviet Presence in Yemen*” CIA.gov, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T00429A001100040006-5.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2017).

- Central Intelligence Agency. "Soviet Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean." CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R002200020002-8.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2017).
- Central Intelligence Agency. "Soviet Naval Ships and Arms Shipments at Aden South Yemen April 1978-April 1979." CIA.gov. <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79T01819A000100610001-7.pdf> (accessed on July 20, 2017).
- Curtis, Glenn E, Eric J Hooglund, and Library Of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Iran: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: U.S. G.P.O, 2008. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/2008011784/>. (Accessed February 23, 2018.)
- Dale, Col Ronald P., *Mobilization for Operation Desert Shield/Storm, Lessons Learned*, Research Report no. AD-A251-205, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, April 1992, 12.
- Day, Stephen W. *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen: A Troubled National Union*. Cambridge Middle East Studies; 37. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- DeGuzman, Robert, Brown, Jeffery Brown, Fulford, Thomas, Porter, Jesse, and Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca. "Cost Benefit Analysis of the Department of the Navy's F-5 Tiger II Contract." 2003.
- Dodson, Christine. PD/NSC-18: U.S. National Strategy, 1977, Digital National Security Archive - DNSA: Document Records (accessed August 20, 2017).
- Dunbar, Charles Franklin, US Ambassador to Yemen 1988-1991, interviewed by Charles P. Rego, telephonically, November 9, 2017.
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume V, The Near East and Africa; eds. John A. Bernbaum, Paul Claussen, Joan M. Lee, Carl N. Raether, Lisle A. Rose, Charles S. Sampson, David H. Stauffer (Washington: Government Printing Office), 1193-1198. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v05/d682>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XVIII, Near East; ed. Nina Noring (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995), Document 177. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v18/d177>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 26. <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d26>

- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 171.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d171>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 181.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d181>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 207.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d207>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 230.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d230>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 234.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d234>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 235
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d235>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 238.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d238>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 240.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d240>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 245.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d245>

- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 246.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d246>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 253.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d253>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 254.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d254>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 255.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d255>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 256.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d256>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 265.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d265>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 266.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d266>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 267.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d267>
- Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 269.
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d269>

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 271.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d271>

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 293.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d293>

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume XVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, ed. Kelly M. McFarland (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2015), Document 300.

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v18/d300>

Gause, F. Gregory. *Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Gerald R. Ford: "Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate on Designation of Developing Countries for Purposes of the Generalized System of Preferences", March 24, 1975. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*.

<http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=4799>.

Gorshkov, Sergey G. *The Sea Power of the State*. Elsevier Science, 1979. 279

Hubbert, M.K. *U. S. Energy Resources: A Review as of 1972. A Background Paper* Prepared at the Request of Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, US Senate Pursuant to S. Res. 45, A National Fuels and Energy Policy Study. Geological Survey, Washington, DC, 1974.

Katz, Mark. "Sanaa and the Soviets." *Problems of Communism* vol. 33, no. 1 (1984): 21-34.

Katz, Mark. "Yemeni Unity and Saudi Security." *Middle East Policy* vol. 1, no. 1 (1992): 117-35.

Lackner, Helen, London Middle East Institute, and British-Yemeni Society. *Why Yemen Matters: A Society in Transition*. SOAS Middle East Issues. London: Saqi, 2014.

Meital, Yoram "Egypt-Israel since the Camp David Accords and Peace Treaty" *Middle East Institute Viewpoints Special Edition: The Legacy of Camp David: 1979-2009*, 2010, 45-47.

Metz, Helen Chapin, and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Turkey: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of

Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O, 1996. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/95049612/>. (Accessed February 23, 2018.)

———, and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Saudi Arabia: a country study*. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress: For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O, 1993. Pdf. Retrieved from the Library of Congress, <https://www.loc.gov/item/93028506/>. (Accessed February 23, 2018.)

Miller, Judith. "Mideast Tensions; Yemen's Chief Assails Saudis on Gulf Crisis." *New York Times* (New York, NY), October 26, 1990.

George Lane, US Ambassador to Yemen 1978-1981, interviewed by Richard Nethercut, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, August 27, 1990.

Lt Col Michael A. Nelson and Lt Col Thomas P. O'Neil, *United States Air Force Contributions to Saudi Arabian Air Defense: Present Needs and Future Options*, Research Report AD-A217-293 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, May 1989).

Morgenthau, Hans J. "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid." *American Political Science Review* vol. 56, no. 2 (1962): 301-09.

Myloie, Laurie., and Rand Corporation. *Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges*. A Rand Note; N-2052-AF. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1983.

Orkaby, Asher. *Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68*. Oxford Studies in International History. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Parker, Chad H. *Making the Desert Modern: Americans, Arabs, and Oil on the Saudi Frontier, 1933-1973. Culture, Politics, and the Cold War*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2015. 15-34.

Peace Corps of the United States. "Submission to the Congress- Fiscal Year 1980 Budget Estimate, International Programs (Peace Corps)." [Peacecorps.org. https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/cbj/1980.pdf](https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/cbj/1980.pdf) (accessed November 28, 2017).

Peace Corps of the United States. "Congressional Presentation- FY 1992." [Peacecorps.org. https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/cbj/1992.pdf](https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.peacecorps.gov/manuals/cbj/1992.pdf) (accessed November 28, 2017).

- Primakov, Yevgeny. "USA: Policy of Destabilization in the Middle East." *International Affairs*, 1984, 39-47.
- Rearden, Steven L., Foulks, Kenneth R., and United States. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint History Office, Issuing Body. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1977-80. History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; v. 12. Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015.
- Ryan, Curtis. "Jordan and the Rise and Fall of the Arab Cooperation Council." *Middle East Journal* 52 (1998): 386-401.
- Symonds, Craig L. *The U.S. Navy: A Concise History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
- Tutwiler, Richard N, Salem-Murdock, Muneera, and Horowitz, Michael A. *Workshop on the Problems and Prospects for Development in the Yemen Arab Republic: The Contribution of the Social Sciences, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., October 22, 1976 : A Report. Institute for Development Anthropology* (Binghamton, N.Y.). IDA Report; No. 2. Y. Binghamton, N.Y.: Institute for Development Anthropology, 1976.
- Twinam, Joseph. "America and The Gulf Arabs." *American - Arab Affairs*, no. 25 (1988): 126.
- United States Agency for International Development, "Yemen Gap Analysis: Strategic Planning and Analysis Division," www.usaid.gov, <https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/Yemen%202011.pdf> (accessed January 3, 2018).
- United States, Congress. *The Attack on the U.S.S. Cole: Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services*, United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, October 19 and 25, 2000. U.S. G.P.O. Congressional Sales Office, 2002.
- US Central Command. "The United States Military Training Mission (USMTM) to Saudi Arabia." <http://www.centcom.mil/OPERATIONS-AND-EXERCISES/USMTM/> (accessed December 15, 2017).
- US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1972-1982. Available at <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/185658.pdf> (accessed on September 28, 2017).
- US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1988. <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/> (accessed on September 28, 2017).

- US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1991-1992. <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/> (accessed on September 28, 2017).
- US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers 1995. <https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/> (accessed on September 28, 2017).
- United States. Division of the Federal Register. *The Code of Federal Regulations of the United States of America*, 1980.
- "U.S. Asserts a Soviet Submarine Has Entered South Yemen Port." *New York Times* (1923-Current File) (New York, N.Y.), August 06, 1979.
- Van Hollen, Christopher. "North Yemen: A Dangerous Pentagonal Game." *The Washington Quarterly* vol. 5, no. 3 (1982): 137-42.
- Varisco, Daniel, Wenner, Manfred, and Pillsbury, Barbara, Manfred Wenner (ed), *A Social and Institutional Profile of the Yemen Arab Republic*. Prepared for Agency for International Development, Washington DC by AIYS, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, n.d, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNAAQ893.pdf (accessed on April 23, 2017).
- US-GCC Corporate Cooperation Committee. *Whither Saudi Arabian-Yemeni Relations? Interests and Implications for US Policies*. John Duke Anthony. Available at <https://ncusar.org/publications/Publications/1999-07-01-Whither-Saudi-Yemeni-Relations.pdf>
- World Bank. "World Bank Country and Lending Groups." https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519#High_income%7CThe (accessed November 8, 2017).
- World Bank. 1979. Yemen Arab Republic - Development of a traditional economy (English). A World Bank country study. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/818431468781149336/Yemen-Arab-Republic-Development-of-a-traditional-economy>
- Works Consulted
- Ariel, Ari. Jewish-Muslim Relations and Migration from Yemen to Palestine in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. *Brill's Series in Jewish Studies* vol. 50. Boston: Brill, 2014.

- Bösch, Frank. "Energy Diplomacy: West Germany, the Soviet Union and the Oil Crises of the 1970s." *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* vol. 39, no. 4 (150) (2014): 165-85.
- Israel Ministry of Aliyah and Integration. "On Eagle's Wings- Aliyah from Yemen (1949)," www.moia.gov.il.
<http://www.moia.gov.il/English/FeelingIsrael/AboutIsrael/Pages/kanfeyNesharim.aspx> (accessed February 2, 2018).
- Meron, Ya'akov. "Why Jews Fled the Arab Countries." *The Middle East Quarterly*, vol. 2 Number 3 (1995): 47-55.
- Pridham, B. *Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background*. 1984.
- Ruttan, Vernon W. "Lost Directions: U.S. Foreign Assistance Policy since New Directions." *The Journal of Developing Areas* vol. 24, no. 2 (1990): 127-80.
- Zickel, Raymond E., Keefe, Eugene K, and Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. *Soviet Union, a Country Study*. 2nd ed. Area Handbook Series. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1991.